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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECT OF AUDITING STANDARD No. 5 ON AUDIT DELAY AND AUDIT FEES 
 
By 
 
Mark Washburn 
 
Formed under the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was charged with providing the interpretive 
guidance for auditors to use in carrying out their responsibilities under Sarbanes-Oxley 
Section 404.  Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2) provided the initial guidance to auditors 
beginning in 2004.  Early research on audit delay and audit fees under these new 
requirements revealed significant increases in both.  Although audit delay and audit fees 
decreased in subsequent years, they remained much higher than predicted.  As a result 
of the concerns and complaints of the accounting profession and the public firms 
affected by AS2, the PCAOB rescinded AS2 and replaced it with Auditing Standard No. 5 
(AS5) in 2007.  The primary objective of the new guidance focuses the auditors’ 
attention on the most important matters in the audit of internal controls over financial 
reporting and eliminating procedures that the Board believes are unnecessary to an 
effective audit of internal control.  Intended to streamline the audit process, the goal of 
the PCAOB was to reduce audit delay and audit fees.  Research in the AS5 era has 
produced mixed results for both.  In this study, I extend the early AS5 research to 
determine if AS5 has had a significant impact on reducing both audit delay and audit 
fees.  Using multiple regression analysis, I examine audit delay and audit fees from 2007 
through 2013 to determine their long-term trend.  Data sources include Audit Analytics, 
Compustat, and CRSP.  Based on the literature review, I expect to find a decrease to 
both audit delay and audit fees over the long-term.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Background of Problem 
 
 In 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in an effort to restore 
public confidence in U.S. financial markets by improving the timeliness and quality of 
financial reporting.  The accounting failures associated with the collapse of Enron, Tyco, 
and Worldcom caused Congress to act in the best interests of the investing public.  
Congress charged the SEC with all enforcement activities associated with the new law. 
The accuracy and timeliness of accounting information directly affect firms’ 
securities prices.  If financial information is less than credible, capital markets behave 
less efficiently.  This results in poor allocation of investment capital further increases the 
rate of return demanded by investors.
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains multiple sections, but Section 404 has proven 
to be the most controversial.  Section 404 requires publicly traded firms on U.S. financial 
markets to include their assessment of internal controls over financial reporting.  
Initially, the external auditors were required to provide an attestation to management’s 
assessment of internal controls over financial reporting. 
 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), an agency created by 
Congress under a provision of SOX, was charged with establishing standards relating to 
public company audits and enforcing compliance with SOX.  These standards provide the 
interpretive guidance to auditors in their efforts to implement the provisions of SOX 
Section 404.  Initially, the PCAOB implemented Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2) to provide 
the aforementioned interpretive guidance.  Effective for audits performed beginning in 
2004, SOX Section 404 proved to be costly and time-consuming to implement.  Initial 
studies conducted in the AS2 era reveal significant increases to audit delay and audit 
fees (Ettredge, Li, & Son, 2006 and Grundfest & Bochner, 2007).  Although audit delay 
and audit fees declined after the initial year under AS2 guidance, both remained 
unacceptably high (Ettredge, Li, & Son, 2006 and Grundfest & Bochner, 2007).  Acting in 
response to the concerns and complaints of the accounting profession as well as the 
publicly traded firms affected by AS2, the PCAOB took swift action to these unintended 
consequences by replacing AS2 with Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) in 2007. 
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From its beginning, SOX generated substantial controversy, primarily centered 
on its compliance costs versus its perceived benefits.  SOX contains eleven major titles, 
each with one or more sections, all aimed at regaining and restoring investor 
confidence.  SOX Section 404, which requires publicly traded companies to include their 
assessment of internal controls over financial reporting as well as an attestation by the 
external audit firm, generates the most debate and controversy.  Although the primary 
objectives of Section 404 of improving the accuracy and timeliness of financial 
disclosures appear simplistic, its implementation has been anything but simple.  In 
response to lax attitudes and practices in the pre-SOX era, auditors and firms both 
applied overly aggressive interpretations to SOX 404 to ward off criticism of insufficient 
vigor.  Initially, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented Section 404 
requirements slowly in an attempt to reduce audit firms and reporting companies’ 
struggle adapting to these new auditing and reporting standards.  The SEC initially 
required qualifying companies to implement the reporting requirements within 
prescribed deadlines.  After several changes, the SEC settled on the following company 
classifications and deadlines.  First, in 2005, a new classification was carved out of the  
accelerated filer category.  This new classification was designated as large accelerated 
filers (LAFs).  These were firms with a public float of at least $700 million.  Public float is 
defined by the SEC as the number of shares available for investors to trade.  Large  
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accelerated filers initially had to file their annual reports within seventy-five days after 
the end of their fiscal year.  Accelerated filers (AFs), companies with a public float of at 
least $75 million but less than $700 million, were also subject to this expeditious 
deadline.  In 2006, the deadline for LAFs was reduced to sixty days, while the deadline 
for AFs remained at 75 days.  The SEC relaxed implementation deadlines several times 
to allow both audit firms and businesses time to comply with the new rules and 
procedures.  Research provides evidence that significant increases to audit delay (the 
length of time between a firm’s fiscal year end to the date the auditors sign their report) 
and audit fees arose as audit firms and businesses attempted to comply with the vague 
and subjective wording of Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2) (Grundfest & Bochner, 2007).  
After considerable debate and criticism of AS2 by both businesses and audit firms, the 
SEC approved Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5).  AS5 was effective for businesses whose 
fiscal year ended on or after November 15, 2007. AS5 provides a top-down approach to 
the audit and streamlines many of the processes established in AS2.  The Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) intended that AS5 would lead to 
increased efficiencies in the audit process and thus decrease audit delay and audit cost 
by directing auditor focus on those matters considered most important to the audit 
process and eliminating procedures unnecessary to an effective audit of internal 
controls (PCAOB, 2010).  Initial studies do not conclusively show that the new standard  
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led to reductions to either audit delay or audit cost nor do the studies demonstrate that 
auditors understand how to apply AS5 guidance to achieve best results at the lowest 
cost (Cohn, 2012).  The purpose of this study is to investigate whether audit delay and 
audit cost decrease after the implementation of AS5.   
 Ultimately, the most important questions to be answered in this study focus on 
how well AS5 has performed in achieving reductions to audit delay and audit fees.  
Before such questions can be addressed, it is necessary to understand the past and 
prevailing regulatory environment as well as why we got to this point.  Auditing 
Standard No. 5 establishes a streamlined audit process intended to increase auditor 
effectiveness and eliminate costly and unnecessary audit procedures. Prior research 
identifies increased audit delay and audit fees as unintended consequences of the 
predecessor standard to AS5, AS2, by providing extra layers of compliance (Krishnan & 
Yang, 2009; Beneish, Biddings, & Hodder, 2008; Hogan & Wilkins, 2008; Krishnan, Rama 
& Zhang, 2008; Patterson & Smith, 2007;  Behn, Searcy, & Woodroof, 2006; Pollock, 
2006; and Controllers Report, 2005).  
 In 2004, the first year of SOX Section 404 reporting with auditors using AS2 as 
the interpretive guidance, audit delay increased 20 days from the prior year without 
SOX 404 and AS2 (Ettredge, Li, & Sun, 2006).  According to a report prepared by CRA 
International (2005), first year total Section 404 implementation costs for large  
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accelerated filer averaged $7.3 million and $1.5 million for accelerated filers.  The SEC 
estimated these costs at $91,000 (Grundfest & Bochner, 2007).  Stripping out the costs 
other than Section 404 related audit fees reduced implementation cost for large 
accelerated filers to an average $1.9 million and accelerated filers to an average cost of 
$520 thousand, still far exceeding the SEC estimate.  Although compliance costs 
decreased in 2005, they remained much higher than the SEC estimate (Grundfest & 
Bochner, 2007).  Subsequent studies indicate decreased fees in the first two years of 
AS5, but results are divided between firms without previous internal control weaknesses 
and those with previous internal control weaknesses (Hoag & Hollingsworth, 2011; 
Krishnan, Krishnan & Song, 2011).   
 In the post AS5 era, Munsif, Raghunandan, and Rama (2012) find audit delay 
increase in the presence of material weaknesses over internal control when comparing 
results between large accelerated and accelerated filers.  Impink, Lubberline, Praag, & 
Veenman (2012) find tightened filing deadlines are not associated with changes in the 
incidence of late filing.  Clearly, prior research focuses on determinants of audit delay 
and audit cost but no study to date has examined the actual trend of audit delay and 
audit cost comparing the pre-AS5 period to the post-AS5 period. In fact, I find no studies 
that examine both these issues concurrently.  As such, it represents a comprehensive 
study to examine both audit delay and audit cost in the AS5 period to 2012.  This study  
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
contributes to the literature with this analysis and should answer the question if the SEC 
achieved their objectives by examining whether AS5 improved the audit process and 
thus real reductions in audit delay and audit fees are occurring. 
 Audit delay measures the time between the end of a firm’s fiscal year and the 
date the auditor signs the report.  Although audit delay is also referred to as audit lag or 
audit report lag in the literature, I use the term audit delay throughout this study. Total 
audit cost consists of two components, Section 404 audit-related fees and 
implementation costs other than Section 404 audit-related fees.  Audit cost as described 
in the literature typically includes both components when stated as a dollar amount. 
The top three non-audit related implementation fees cited in the CRA (2005) survey 
include initial documentation costs, learning curve costs, and remediation efforts.   
 Slow disclosure also represents potentially bad news.  Prior research finds that 
firms disclosing information in a timely manner are more likely to have clean audit 
opinions (Chambers & Penman, 1984). Givoly and Palmon (1982) suggest that 
management has incentives when exercising discretion when timing reporting 
disclosures, particularly the release of bad news.   Thus, increased audit delay likely 
signals bad news to investors as well as extends the audit time, increasing audit fees.  
Therefore, changes to the audit process specifically aimed at streamlining audit 
procedures should lead to improvements in audit delay and audit cost.  This research  
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attempts to answer the question if audit delay and audit fees decreased after the 
implementation of AS5.  This research should be of interest to regulatory agencies such 
as the SEC, the PCAOB, audit firms, publicly traded businesses subject to SEC regulation, 
and investors. 
Audit Delay 
 Most prior studies of audit delay and audit fees focus on the determinants of the 
phenomena.  Ettredge et al., (2006) examine the impact of AS2 and Section 404 internal 
control quality assessment on audit delay.  In particular, they examine how Section 404 
implementation issues increases audit delay. They measure audit delay consistent with 
Leventis, Weetman, and Caramanis (2005) and compare that same measurement to pre-
SOX accounting periods.  They find the number of days increase in the post-SOX era 
suggesting Section 404 added additional reporting burdens on auditors, thus increasing 
the time to complete audit duties.  Discussing limitations of their study, they note that 
timeliness prevented analysis of data beyond one year of SOX implementation.  An issue 
suggested for future research is to extend their study to determine if audit delays 
continue to be a problem. This study responds to their recommendation by extending 
the analysis to include the additional years (2008 through 2013) firms have been subject 
to AS5.  
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Since the Ettredge et al., (2006) study, AS5 (PCAOB 2007) superseded AS2 
(PCAOB 2004).  The main objective of AS5 is to streamline the audit process which 
should lead to decreased audit delay and audit fees.  
Other research (Bedard and Graham, 2011; Ettredge et al., 2006) finds audit 
delay associated with material weakness in internal control over financial reporting 
(ICOFR).  Firms with material weaknesses require more time to complete the audit 
process (Bryant-Kutcher, Peng, & Zvinakis, 2007). Research finds audit delay affects the 
timeliness of accounting information and also signals conditions which have a negative 
market reaction (Impink et al., 2012; Feldman, Rosenfeld, Lazar, & Segal, 2006).  Firms 
suffer regulatory sanctions in addition to market discipline for extended audit delay 
(Givoly & Palmon, 1982).   
 Audit delay results from various causes.  Researchers find vague and subjective 
wording in early interpretive guidance provided by the PCAOB contributes to audit delay 
(Orcutt, 2009; Grundfest & Bochner, 2007).  Knechel and Sharma (2012) examine audit 
delay both pre and post SOX and find that companies with high non-audit service fees 
associated with shorter audit report lags.  Regulators need to understand the 
determinants of audit delay so they may effectively promulgate rules designed to 
decrease delay (Leventis et al., 2005).    
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Prior to SOX 404 and AS2 implementation, audit delay averaged 50 days.  In 
2004, the first year of AS2 implementation, the mean delay increased to 70 days 
(Ettredge et al., 2006).  While 70 days average delay is less than the time frame of 75 
days allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for filing 10K reports, the 
increase of 20 days represents a significant increase.   
 Following AS5 implementation, Munsif, Raghunandan, and Rama (2012) extend 
the audit delay work of Ettredge et al., (2006) using data from 2008 and 2009.  
Additionally and unlike Ettredge et al., (2006), they stratify their sample into two groups, 
accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers.  They find audit delay increased during 
2008 and 2009 with the 2009 results for accelerated filers showing significantly less 
effect on audit report lag.  Results for non-accelerated filers show no such change.  
Other research (Impink et al., 2012) explores the timeliness of 10-K reporting relative to 
SEC filing deadline changes, but did not associate these late filings with audit delay.  
 Feldman et al. (2006) find audit delay affects the timeliness of accounting 
information and also signals conditions which have a negative market reaction.  Audit 
delay attributable to SOX 404 complexity and its supporting guidelines has received 
considerable attention from the SEC and its support agencies since 2004.   
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Audit Fees  
Perhaps the most controversial outcome resulting from SOX, SOX Section 404, 
and AS2 implementation is audit fees.  The criticism of SOX and AS2 focuses on the 
perception of benefits attained versus cost incurred and the disproportionate expense 
incurred by small businesses.  The SEC clearly underestimated the impact of SOX and 
AS2 on audit fees.  Compliance costs in the initial year of SOX Section 404 reporting as 
guided by AS2 exceeded SEC projections by some 80 times for large accelerated filers 
and 16 times for accelerated filers (Grundfest & Bochner, 2007).  These excessive costs 
generated intense criticism from both businesses and audit firms.  Senator Paul 
Sarbanes, the co-author of the SOX legislation, expressed his belief that the auditor’s 
engagement to evaluate management’s compliance with Section 404 should not result 
in increased fees (Pollock, 2006). Much of the criticism centered on the vague and 
subjective language of AS2, which provided guidance as to how the audit should be 
conducted.  After the accounting scandals surrounding businesses such as Enron and 
Arthur Anderson, audit firms transformed what had been rather lax approaches to the 
audit into audits of hypervigilance.  As a direct consequence of the additional audit 
requirements first imposed by AS2, as well as the additional resources required to  
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address the additional requirements, auditors increased audit fees (Jiang & Wu, 2009).  
Firms were often guilty of over-auditing when risk was not material.  Other factors 
contributing to the excessive costs were lack of staffing, by both businesses and audit  
firms, increase in documentation required under the new regulations, and the learning 
curve effect (CRA, 2005).  SOX 404 imposed real costs to the attestation function due to 
the additional layer of regulation required by SOX in general and Section 404 in 
particular (Iliev, 2010).  Compounded by the new requirements, audit costs exploded in 
the years immediately following the AS2 implementation (Grundfest & Bochner, 2007).   
 As a result of the SEC re-examination of AS2 and following a period of invited 
public comment, the PCAOB proposed a new audit approach to replace the way audits 
were being conducted under AS2.  In mid-June 2007, Auditing Standard No. 5 received 
final approval.  Designed to increase audit efficiency by streamlining audit practices, AS5 
superseded AS2.  Christopher Cox, while head of the SEC, testified before the U.S. House 
of Representatives Committee on Small Business on December 12, 2007, that it was the 
intention of the SEC that AS5 would lower overall compliance cost to all businesses 
regardless of size.  A key provision of AS5 allows the auditor to scale the audit, which in 
theory permits the auditor to adjust field work based on the size and complexity of the 
audited firm. 
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Another provision of SOX prevents businesses engaging in substantial consulting 
and other non-audit related activities with the firms they audit.  This effects a shift away 
from using the audit fee as a “loss leader” when it could be bundled in a package of 
services.  As a result, audit fees had to more accurately reflect their true economic cost.   
However, Hoag and Hollingsworth (2011) point out anecdotal stories of higher audit 
costs that imply price gouging by audit firms.  In their study they cite a study performed 
by the law firm of Foley and Lardner which suggests price gouging after companies 
reported significant reductions to internal Section 404 costs but no corresponding 
reduction in audit fees charged.  According to the National Venture Capital Association 
(NVCA), many venture capital backed companies use Big 4 accounting firms to perform 
Section 404 audits because SOX 404 requires the use of only registered accounting 
firms.  Thus, small companies that decide to go public pay premiums to have Big 4 
accounting firms conduct their SOX 404 audits.  As an alternative, the NVCA points out 
that many of these companies either refuse to go public or take their IPOs to foreign 
exchanges directly as result of the high cost of compliance with SOX 404 (Hessen, 2007).   
However, Hoag and Hollingsworth (2011) use audit pricing theory and an audit risk 
model to reinforce the concept that audit pricing is a function of both risk and effort.    
Dickins, Higgs, and Skantz (2008) document changes in audit fees resulting from a 
significant change in the audit fee estimation process in the post SOX era.  Not  
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surprisingly, as audit requirements changed and the perception of audit risk changed, 
fees increased. 
 Early evidence shows that audit costs declined in the second year of AS2, but not 
to the extent projected by the SEC.  Foster, Ornstein, and Shastri (2007) examine audit 
fees in the AS2 period and find no significant decrease in the second reporting year, but 
their study is limited to audit cost behavior only during the 2003 to 2005 period.  Since 
most of the studies on audit costs, even the most recent ones, examine audit cost 
behavior during the AS2 period or just the first and second years of AS5, the body of 
knowledge is limited about the trend of audit cost behavior.  Thus, this study 
contributes to the existing literature by examining audit cost behavior over a greater 
period of time, which should produce a better picture of the trend of audit cost as we 
get further from the implementation year. 
Purpose of Study 
 The purpose of this research is to determine if audit delay and audit cost 
decreased following the implementation of AS5.  The unintended increases to both 
audit delay and audit fees under the initial auditing standard, AS2, led the PCAOB to 
rescind AS2 and replace it with AS5.  The PCAOB expected this new auditing standard to 
streamline the audit process, theoretically reducing audit efforts thus reduce both audit 
delay and audit fees.  This research contributes to the existing audit delay and audit fee  
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literature by examining the impact of AS5 in an effort to determine if a decreasing trend 
exists for both audit delay and audit fees.  Evidence of a decrease would provide 
regulators such as the SEC and the PCAOB positive feedback that AS5 has been effective 
in streamlining the audit process.  Conversely, evidence of no significant decreases  
would suggest AS5 has not been effective in streamlining the audit process and further 
efforts are required. 
Research Questions 
 This study examines the following research questions: 
Question 1: Did audit delay decrease for U.S. companies classified as large, accelerated 
filers and accelerated filers with calendar year ends 2007-2013 subsequent to AS5 
implementation? 
Question 2: Did audit fees decrease for U.S. companies classified as large, accelerated 
filers and accelerated filers with calendar year ends 2007-2013 subsequent to AS5 
implementation? 
 This study provides further empirical evidence of the effect of AS5 on audit delay 
and audit fees.  
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
Expected Contribution of the Study 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge regarding the effectiveness of 
AS5 in reducing audit delay and audit fees.  This study is expected to provide evidence of 
a decrease in audit delay and audit fees since the AS5 implementation.  If the evidence 
supports the decrease, it will provide feedback to regulatory bodies such as the SEC and  
PCAOB that AS5 has been effective since its implementation and that further revisions 
of this interpretive guidance is not necessary.  This study provides a comprehensive 
review of AS5 trends since its implementation and thus builds on the results obtained in 
prior studies which only review the first or the first and second audit periods following 
implementation.  Agency theory and signaling theory contribute to the theoretical 
perspective of this study.  
Organization of the Study 
 The remainder of this study provides the literature background, the 
methodology used to investigate the relationships, the results of the investigation, and 
concluding remarks.  Chapter two discusses the prior literature related to this study.  
Chapter three describes the methodology employed for the study.  Chapter four 
explains the results of the data analysis.  Chapter five summarizes the results and 
provides suggestions and direction for future research.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 This chapter includes discussions of the relevant literature on audit delay and 
audit costs.  Included also is an overview of agency theory as it pertains to these matters 
and an integration of signaling theory.  This chapter reviews the literature in audit delay 
and audit fees prior to and subsequent to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX) and also focuses on the effective periods of Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2) 
and Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5). 
Voluntary and mandatory disclosures of conflicting interests are rooted in 
agency law (Mahoney, 1995). Mahoney (1995) further argues that mandatory 
disclosures aid in reducing agency costs arising from conflicting interests of managers 
and investors.  Section 404 of SOX requires reporting companies to provide new, 
additional disclosures regarding their internal controls over financial reporting and 
imposes greater responsibilities on U.S. firms to maintain effective internal controls over 
financial reporting. SOX Section 409 authorizes the SEC to compel reporting firms to 
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publicly disclose information about material changes in their financial condition or 
operations (Ettredge et al., 2006).   
 The obligation to disclose these reports and information lies with the senior 
management of these firms.  Senior management, despite regulations, does not always 
accurately or timely disclose information to the public.  Thus, an element of risk exists 
with respect to these disclosures.  Underlying reasons for this unprofessional and 
possibly illegal activity vary, but certainly the opportunity to enrich themselves at 
stockholders’ expense figures into the discussion (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
 According to Orcutt (2009), a more systematic source of erroneous data 
disclosed by management is the inadvertent use of either inaccurate or incomplete 
information.  Impink et al., (2012) find negative market reactions to late filing 
notifications when management provides no meaningful explanation with their Form 
12b-25 filings.  Firms use these forms to notify the SEC when they cannot meet the 
deadline for filing Form 10-K and Form 10-Q.  Approved Form 12b-25 filings grant firms 
an additional 15(5) days to file the Form 10-K (10-Q).  An explanation for the request is 
not required, but firms not providing an explanation suffer market sanctions (Impink et 
al., 2012).  Bryant-Kutcher et al., (2007) find negative market reactions associated with 
Form 12b-25 filings, implying such delays signal bad news. Prior research suggests  
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investors respond negatively to Form 10-K and Form 10-Q filed after a Form 12b-25 
filing (Griffin, 2003). 
 As businesses gather and assess their data, they use the information to make 
both mandatory and voluntary disclosures.  The value of accounting information lies 
with its accuracy and timeliness. Provided businesses adhere to quality internal controls, 
the quality of the accounting information disclosed should better inform investors which 
translates into securities markets which operate more efficiently and more directly, to a 
lower cost of capital for those businesses (Lang, Lins, & Maffett, 2012).  Francis, Huang, 
Khurana, and Pereira (2009) research transparency and its influence on efficient 
resource allocations.  They find transparency influences a greater flow of resources (i.e., 
capital) to businesses possessing better growth opportunities.  Orcutt (2009) posits 
businesses providing less than credible disclosures suffer from diminished market 
pricing leading to less than desirable allocation of investment capital.  Businesses can 
influence their cost of capital by their corporate disclosure policies as long as the 
information is credible (Easley & O’Hara, 2004).  Nagy (2010) provides empirical 
evidence that Section 404 compliance reduces the possibility of issuing materially 
misstated financial statements, suggesting Section 404 is fulfilling its intended objective 
of improving financial statement quality.  Therefore, management has incentives to 
provide accurate and timely disclosures.   
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Signaling theory recognizes that one party (the agent) to a transaction possesses 
greater or unequal levels of information than another party (the principal) (Spence, 
1973; Morris, 1987; Connelly, Certo, Ireland & Reutzel, 2011).  Information can be public 
or private.  Holders of private information have the potential to make better decisions 
than those without access (Connelly et al., 2011).  This information asymmetry results in 
one party (principals) not knowing valuable information about the quality of the firm.  
Management can communicate quality by making voluntary disclosures or early release 
of mandatory disclosures.  Early and timely release of information can be viewed as a 
signal of the quality of the firm to other parties.  The timing of required disclosure, 
whether released in advance of required SEC filings or delayed beyond the normal 
release date, can have an impact on the cost of capital and the audit engagement 
(Mahoney, 1995).   
 Based on signaling theory, audit delay and audit fees represent issues that affect 
capital markets.  Management possesses the financial data of the firm, shareholders 
typically do not.  AS5 was intended to provide streamlined audit processes that would 
presumptively reduce audit delay and audit fees, as either or both tend to signal bad 
news to securities markets.  Previous research finds audit delay signals conditions which 
have a negative impact on investor confidence in capital markets and creates volatility 
(Hakansson, 1977).  Ashton et al., (1989) find empirical research supports the assertion  
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that management exercises discretion versus the delayed release of bad news. The SEC 
and the PCAOB desire to minimize the negative impact of audit delay by implementing 
AS5 to streamline the audit process and reduce audit delays.   
Agency Theory 
 Unless required by statute or regulation, management has the option of 
disclosing private information about the firm on a voluntary basis.  SOX Section 409 
mandates firms make quick public disclosure of information on material changes in their 
financial condition or operations.  Slow disclosure potentially represents bad news, 
whereas timely disclosures tend to represent good news (Givoly & Palmon, 1982).  
Mandatory disclosure also provides insider information helpful to market participants in 
determining securities pricing by making available more information (Mahoney, 1995). 
 Agency theory provides the underpinning for this quantitative study.  Agency 
theory has been used in accounting research to describe the relationship and activities 
of management (the agent) and stockholders (the principals).  It involves the study of 
inevitable conflicts of interest that occur between these two parties due to 
opportunistic behavior (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  This opportunistic behavior reveals 
itself whenever the agent does not act in the best interest of the principal.  Since 
conflict abounds between executive management and shareholders, management  
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should be constrained by appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as 
regulatory monitoring (He & Ho, 2011).  The problem is one of verification.  The 
principal encounters limitations trying to verify what the agent is actually doing 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Mahoney, 1995).  These monitoring attempts can be difficult and 
expensive to devise.  Management has access to information not readily or easily 
accessible to stockholders or other interested parties (Kross & Schroeder, 1984; Healy & 
Palepu, 2001).  Publicly traded corporations typically exhibit more problems associated 
with agency theory as privately held corporations tend to be managed by their 
shareholder/owners.  U.S. publicly traded companies fall under the jurisdiction of the 
SEC, which requires among other matters, disclosures of management’s compensation 
as well as significant transactions between managers and their companies.  Such 
disclosures provide information to shareholders helpful in monitoring the self-interested 
behavior of a company’s management.  Mandatory disclosures remove some of the  
burden of monitoring costs incurred by the principals, effectively reducing total agency 
costs (Mahoney, 1995).  Perhaps the most useful monitoring device is the external audit 
performed by an independent audit firm.  The audit, conducted by a registered public 
accounting firm, examines evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures found in a 
company’s financial statements in order to form an opinion as to whether the financials 
are free from material misstatement.  The goal of the audit is to provide users of the  
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financial statements with reasonable assurance they are fairly stated.  Thus, the 
usefulness and purpose of the external audit as a means of monitoring management 
opportunistic behavior provides a foundation for this quantitative study. 
Signaling Theory 
 Signaling theory is based on information asymmetry. Perhaps more correctly, it is 
primarily concerned with reducing information asymmetry between two parties such as 
agent and principals (Spence, 2002).  Typically, management has access to firm 
information that is not possessed by or available to the shareholder.  In an attempt to 
equalize this asymmetry, management signals shareholders by providing relevant 
information to them that, if interpreted correctly, causes the shareholders to adjust 
their investing behavior (Connelly et al., 2011).  In a corporate governance setting, CEOs 
signal to potential investors the unobservable quality of their firms using the observable 
quality of their financial statements (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009).  As has been discussed 
previously in this literature review, information affects the decision-making processes 
used by individuals.  However, their decisions are based primarily on information 
available in the public domain.  To the extent they can obtain private information, it too 
is used to make investing decisions.  It is this private information that creates 
information asymmetry.  Individuals possessing private information are able to make  
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better informed decisions, sometimes to the detriment of those who do not possess the 
information.   
 Signaling theory involves a signaler, receiver, and of course, a signal.  The 
signaler is the firm insider, such as the CEO (agent), who has access to information 
about the organization that is not available to the receiver (principal) and provides the 
insider with a privileged perspective about the underlying quality of the business.  This 
information can be positive or negative in context, but either way, would be useful to 
the receiver if it could be obtained (Connelly et al., 2011).  Thus, the early disclosure of a 
clean audit opinion can be used to signal superior firm quality while at the same time 
reduces the information asymmetry (Morris, 1987).  Audit delay’s association with 
negative findings in the audit result in market sanctions against the firm.  Management 
delays this type of voluntary disclosure in an effort to minimize market punishment. 
That management can use the time to engage in opportunistic behavior at the expense 
of the average shareholder cannot be overlooked or discounted.  Newton and Ashton 
(1989) reason that audit delay is the only publicly observable measure of audit 
efficiency.   
Management is motivated to share insider knowledge with external investors so 
that a company’s stock price will increase.  Management has incentives to issue self-
serving announcements and disclosures.  Investors may infer the credibility of voluntary  
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disclosures from other informative managerial signals such as reductions to audit delay.  
Announcements alone are insufficient as this audience will view them as self-serving.  
For information to be credible to external users, it generally must be costly to provide.  
Since any company could release a good news announcement without it being true, 
managers who possess good news would not announce.  Reduced audit delay provides 
an indirect measure of signaling theory as shorter delays are associated with higher firm 
value (Chambers & Penman, 1984).    
Audit Delay 
 Audit delay affects the timeliness of accounting information which adversely 
impacts investor confidence in capital markets.  Auditors are expected to perform 
assurance services without delay, guided by constraints imposed by professional codes 
and ethics (Leventis, et al., 2005).  The SEC indirectly regulates audit delay by restricting 
the amount of time large, accelerated firms have after the end of the year to release 
their annual report, Form 10-K, to 60  days.  The importance of corporate disclosure for 
the functioning of an efficient capital market cannot be understated (Healy & Palepu, 
2001).  Hakansson (1977) explains the timeliness of public disclosures is important 
because delays compromise the idea of equal access to information among investors, 
creating information asymmetry. Delay likely increases the level of uncertainty 
associated with decisions for which the financial statements provide information.  Thus,  
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buy and sell decisions by investors risk delay until earnings reports are made public 
(Givoly & Palmon, 1982).  Given that well-informed investors can exploit their private 
information at the expense of less informed investors provides reason for SEC concerns 
over timeliness of information disclosures. 
 Krishnan and Yang (2009) identify audit delay as one of the unintended 
consequences of AS2 due to the extra layers of compliance required.  This issue, along 
with other issues associated with audit delay, suggests that SOX 404 along with its 
interpretive guidance added a layer of complexity whose effect negated the SEC’s intent 
to improve the timeliness of information release.  Adding new reporting requirements 
for external auditors should increase the time it takes to complete an audit, especially in 
the initial year of implementation.  Research finds audit delay affects the timeliness of 
accounting information and signals conditions which have a negative market reaction 
(Impink et al., 2012; Feldman, Rosenfeld, Lazar, & Segal, 2006).  Firms suffer regulatory 
sanctions in addition to market discipline for extended audit delay (Givoly & Palmon, 
1982).  Other research (Bedard & Graham, 2011; Ettredge et al., 2006) finds audit delay 
associated with material weakness in internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR).  
Firms with material weaknesses require more time to complete the audit process 
(Bryant-Kutcher et al., 2007).  Mande and Son (2011) associate auditor resignations in 
the year following the audit to lengthy audit delay. 
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Audit delay is attributable to the complexities of implementing SOX 404, 
particularly supporting interpretive guidance provided by the PCAOB (Orcutt, 2009; 
Grundfest & Bochner, 2007).  Ashton et al. (1989) find audit delay associated with 
market reactions to information disclosures.  Adverse consequences such as abnormal 
price variability (Impink et al., 2012) and lower abnormal returns (Givoly & Palmon, 
1982; Chambers & Penman, 1984;  Kross & Schroeder, 1984) as well a higher degree of 
information asymmetry (Hakansson, 1977; Bamber et al., 1993) are representative of 
conditions having a negative impact on investor confidence in capital markets.  Impink 
et al., (2012) find that firms disclosing an explanation for filing their 10-Ks late triggers 
negative abnormal returns (-1.35%) when the explanation pertains to material 
weaknesses of internal controls and those negative abnormal returns increase when no 
explanation is provided.  Chambers and Penman (1984) find a positive relationship 
between the size of abnormal post report price variability and the size of the price  
reaction to the size of the price reaction to the report positively related to report lag 
time and higher following the report of bad news than a report of good news.   
 While the effects of SOX have proven difficult to verify, some questions such as 
conservative reporting of earnings and the reduction of firm value can be answered due 
to their discrete results (Iliev, 2010).  Coates (2007) emphasizes assessment of SOX 404 
is complicated by the various financial, economic, and political changes occurring in U.S.  
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capital markets since 2003.  This study examines the issue of the amount of change in 
audit delay and audit fees based on a change to a reporting standard.     
 If AS5 actually streamlined the audit process I would expect to find audit delay 
decreased, ceteris paribus, following AS5 implementation.  This new standard increases 
the likelihood that issues affecting audit delay such as maintaining the integrity of 
internal controls will be discovered before they cause material misstatements of 
financial data.  This objective should steer auditors away from procedures not necessary 
to achieve intended results, reducing audit complexity and audit delay (Bedard & 
Graham, 2011). Reduction in audit delay should lead to more accurate and timely 
accounting disclosures, achieving and validating AS5 and the SEC’s attempt to restore 
confidence to U.S. capital markets.  If it can be shown that audit delay decreased post 
AS5, then the objectives of AS5 will appear to have taken hold and validate the 
effectiveness of AS5.  In this study, I test firms classified as large, accelerated filers and 
accelerated filers to determine their response to the change to AS5.  As the PCAOB 
expects smaller firms to benefit more from AS5, the sample will be divided into two 
groups.  One sample will consist of firms classified as large accelerated filers and the 
other sample will consist of firms classified as accelerated filers.  Each group will be 
independently examined for changes to audit delay and audit fees.    
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
Trends in Audit Delay Research 
In order to understand the magnitude of the problem created by audit delay, it is 
necessary to review audit delay in three periods.  The first period reviews audit delay 
prior to the infamous corporate frauds and accounting failures that occurred early in the 
21st century.  The second period reviews audit delay following enactment of SOX, during 
the effective period of AS2.  The third period reviews audit delay during the effective 
period of AS5.  Research conducted during these three distinct periods focused on 
different issues of audit delay. 
 The accounting profession has long recognized the importance and relevance of 
timeliness (Accounting Principles Board, 1970).  Timeliness is a key characteristic of 
information usefulness.  Feldman et.al (2006) find audit delay affects the timeliness of 
accounting information and also signals conditions which have a negative market 
reaction.   
 Early audit delay research tended to focus on the importance of timeliness of 
accounting information disclosure (Givoly & Palmon, 1982; Chambers & Penman, 1984; 
Kross & Schroeder, 1984).  According to Givoly & Palmon (1982), incentives exist for 
management to employ discretion over the timing of reporting.   Early audit delay 
research conducted by Givoly and Penman (1982) provided empirical evidence linking  
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early disclosure of annual earnings announcements to positive abnormal returns and 
delayed announcements with negative abnormal returns.  Kross and Schroeder (1984)  
extended this early research to quarterly earnings announcements with similar 
empirical results.  Chambers and Penman (1984) further find higher return variability 
associated with earnings report announcements released ahead of expectation when 
compared to timely released reports or unexpected late reports.  The results from these 
studies provide strong support for the belief that management employs discretion when 
timing the release of proprietary information. 
 In these early studies on audit delay, researchers chose certain variables from 
those presented in prior studies, more of an ad hoc selection process than a process 
supported by well-established models or theory.  If the variable appeared to contribute 
to audit delay, it was chosen.  Other variables were chosen on the basis of data 
availability and the direction of the research questions (Givoly & Palmon, 1982). 
 After these early studies, attention turned to various determinants of audit 
delay.  Variables explored included company size, net losses, busy season audits, firm 
complexity, audit firm structure, and auditors’ opinions (Ashton et al., 1989; Bamber et 
al., 1993).  Ashton et al., (1989) find an inverse association between company size and 
audit delay, an inverse association between audit firm size and increased audit delay, 
and a positive association between net losses and audit delay.  Bamber et al., (1993)  
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extend the work of Ashton et al., (1989) by expanding the early audit delay model to 
include audit business risk, audit complexity, and use of a structured audit technology.   
They find a mean audit delay of 40 days with audit delay significantly and positively 
associated with these new, additional variables of interest.  Other researchers extend 
the studies of determinants of audit delay beyond the United States, testing firms listed 
on Canadian and Athens stock exchanges (Ashton et al., 1989; Leventis et al., 2005).  The 
Ashton et al., (1989) sample consisted only of Canadian firms audited by Canadian 
auditors covering the period from 1977 through 1982.  Leventis et al., (2005) focus on 
firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange having a fiscal year end of December 31, 
2000.  They found lengthy audit delay (98 days) associated significantly with variation in 
auditors’ remarks and opinions, audit fees, and type of auditor. 
 With the passage of SOX in 2002, studies of audit delay focus on their 
determinants.  In an early study under the SOX/AS2 regime, Ettredge et al. (2006) 
investigate the impact of AS2 guidance and SOX Section 404 internal control quality 
assessment on audit delay.  In particular, they examine how Section 404 
implementation issues increase audit delay.  They find audit delay immediately prior to 
SOX/AS2 implementation to average 50 days.  In 2004, the first year AS2 provided 
guidance to external auditors, audit delay increased to 70 days (Ettredge et al., 2006).  
They find the number of days significantly increased in the post-SOX era suggesting the  
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requirements of Section 404 increased the time to complete the audit process and for 
the external auditors to issue their reports.  Discussing limitations of their study, they  
noted that timeliness prevented analysis of data beyond one year of SOX 
implementation.  An issue suggested for future research is to extend the study to 
determine if audit delays continue to be a problem. 
 In 2003, the SEC introduced new deadlines accelerating the filing of 10-K reports.  
These accelerated deadlines placed additional pressures on auditors who were already 
facing new regulatory and disclosure guidelines under SOX 404 and 409.  Krishnan and 
Yang (2009), in a study covering 2001 to 2006, find increased audit delay leading up to 
the accelerated SEC filing deadlines, the implementation of SOX 404 reporting 
requirements, and the new rapid disclosure requirements imposed by SOX 409.  
Further, they find audit delay significantly increased in 2004 with gradual reductions in 
2005 and 2006. 
 Audit delay attributable to SOX 404 complexity and its supporting guidelines has 
received considerable attention from the SEC and its support agencies since 2004.  In an 
effort to address the growing criticism created by AS2, the PCAOB focused on ways to 
curb expenditures associated with SOX 404 compliance.  While acknowledging benefits 
of audits of internal controls, the PCAOB recognized the “significant costs” of these 
benefits.  Small firms required to comply with SOX Section 404 bore a disproportionately  
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higher cost of compliance than the largest firms (Krishnan et al., 2008).  Responding to 
this criticism, the PCAOB issued a new proposed standard on December 16, 2006.  The  
proposed standard, Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) included four objectives.  One, focus 
on issues and procedures important to internal auditors.  Two, eliminate procedures 
determined to be unnecessary.  Three, scale the audit in an effort to reduce compliance 
costs for the smallest companies required to comply with SOX 404.  Four, simplify 
requirements by reducing detail and specificity. 
 Following a required period for public comment, the PCAOB issued the new 
standard, Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5), effective for fiscal years ending November 15, 
2007.  AS5 officially superseded AS2 (PCAOB 2007).  AS5 eliminated the requirement for 
auditors to provide an opinion on management’s assessment of internal controls, 
instituted a “top-down” approach in assessing internal controls, directs audit focus to 
high risk areas, allows auditors to scale their tests for smaller and less complex 
companies, and allows auditor’s to once again rely on the work of others such as 
internal auditors. 
 Research of audit delay in the AS5 era remains scant.  In the only published AS5 
era study of audit delay, Munsif et al. (2012) extend Ettredge et al. (2006).  Their study 
examines audit delay during 2008 and 2009, the first two years following AS5 
implementation.  In addition, they include non-accelerated filers as this group now has  
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the same Section 404(a) reporting requirements as the large accelerated and 
accelerated filers.  They find significant increases in audit delay within both filer groups  
during 2008 and 2009.  Munsif et al., (2012) find the effect of internal control material 
weakness on audit delay to be significantly lower in 2009 compared to 2008 when 
examining the large accelerated and accelerated filer groups.  However, audit delay was 
flat within the non-accelerated filer group, meaning audit delay in both periods exhibits 
no significant difference. The Financial Executives Research Foundation, an affiliate of 
Financial Executives International, surveyed public, private, and non-profit companies 
for 2012 data regarding audit fees.  The survey results reveal an increase in audit fees of 
approximately four percent compared to the previous year.  The survey data also 
reveals increases in audit hours, suggesting audit delay increased as well (Cohn, 2013).    
Audit fees  
In 2000, the SEC issued new rules requiring publicly traded companies registered 
with the SEC to disclose fees firms paid to accounting firms.  These companies were 
required to disclose amounts paid to their external auditors, separating audit work from 
consulting and tax services.  Original disclosure requirements revealed that the non-
audit related services generated approximately three times the fees as did audit-related 
activities.  These revelations fueled the belief that auditor independence was impaired, 
possibly tainting auditor ability to remain impartial in their audits. 
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In 2001, the SEC required publicly traded firms in the U.S. to disclose fees paid to 
their auditors.  Initially, the SEC allowed fees be classified as either audit fees or non-
audit fees.  These initial disclosures revealed substantial non-audit fees, causing 
considerable concern in the public domain about auditor independence.  In 2003, as a 
response to substantial and ongoing concern by regulators and the public regarding 
external auditor independence, the SEC established revised fee disclosure rules 
(Asthana & Krishnan, 2006).  The SEC introduced two new categories of non-audit fees, 
audit-related fees and tax-related fees, as well as eliminating the category information 
systems fees.  These new classifications allowed for reclassification of non-audit fees 
into classifications with less objectionable titles to the public (Asthana & Krishnan, 
2006). 
The prior definition of audit fees promulgated by the SEC quite narrowly defined 
them to include the fee paid for the annual audit and review of the company’s financial 
statements included in the quarterly SEC filings.  The new definition includes services 
which can only be provided by the independent accounting firm.  Such services included 
statutory audits and other services rendered on behalf of the SEC.  The newly created 
audit-related fee category includes any type assurance service involving due diligence 
traditionally provided by the independent accounting firm.  Examples provided by the 
SEC include employee benefit plan audits, internal control reviews, and others. 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
  
 
Looking at the impact of SOX on audit fees, it is understandable that audit fees 
would increase in the face of new regulation.  Other factors attributable to SOX 
regarding audit fees include issues such as new audit work paper retention 
requirements found in Section 103 and the denial by SOX for external auditors to rely on 
the work of internal auditors.  Any internal control related work performed by internal 
auditors was required to be repeated by the external auditors if they used such work as 
primary evidence. 
 Dickens, Higgs, and Skantz (2008) conducted interviews with audit practitioners 
and were able to identify variables pre-SOX and post-SOX which influence audit pricing.  
From the pre-SOX era, they identified three factors driving audit pricing: estimated audit 
effort, rank of audit personnel conducting the audit, and risks and rewards from the 
perception of the audit firm.  Post-SOX changes to audits increased the amount of work 
necessary to conduct audits that comply with these new standards.  Where discounts 
were somewhat common pre-SOX for off-peak work, staff shortages at audit firms make 
such discounts less likely.  The economic recession of 2007-2009 led to pressures from 
clients to reduce audit fees (Ettredge, Fuerherm, & Li, 2014).  Both studies identify audit 
risk as a factor to not reduce fees given the probability of legal action and PCAOB 
monitoring of this issue. 
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SOX Section 201 prohibits any registered public accounting firms from 
performing any audit required by SOX if they also provide any non-audit services.  Non-
audit services prohibited by Section 201 include management functions or other 
services related to the accounting records.  Prior to SOX, common billing practices 
allowed audit firms include their audit fee in prepackaged bundle of services.   Such 
bundling enabled audit firms to offer cheap audit fees in a “loss leader” pricing schema.  
SOX Section 201 effectively ended that practice (Foster, et al., 2007).  As compliance 
with Section 404 became mandatory, audit fees increased substantially (Foster et al., 
2007; Jiang & Wu, 2009). 
Initial studies focused on audit fee increases by comparing fees generated in the 
pre-SOX era to those from the post-SOX era (Grundfest & Bochner, 2007; Orcutt, 2009).  
Additionally, audit fees were measured when early audits were guided by AS2, the 
interpretive guidance used by auditors to conduct the audit.  Although results of early 
studies provide some evidence of audit fee decrease during the second year of AS2, fees 
remained significantly above the levels projected by the SEC (Orcutt, 2009).  A later 
regulatory change to AS5 resulted in new changes to audit fees.   
 Compliance with Section 404 reporting differed between large accelerated filers 
and accelerated filers.  Large accelerated filers began compliance with Section 404 first, 
followed later by accelerated filers.  In one of earliest published studies on audit fees,  
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Foster et al. (2007) examined a sample which included companies required to comply 
with SOX 404 reporting requirements (the large accelerated filers) as well as companies 
not yet required to comply with those reporting requirements (accelerated filers) and 
find audit fees increased from 2003 to 2005.  The companies showing the largest 
increases in audit fees were those required to meet the reporting provisions.  Some 
accelerated filers voluntarily began reporting earlier than required by SOX 404 
scheduling.  The variable of interest in this study, mandatory compliance with SOX 404, 
showed firms first complying with Section 404 experienced significantly greater 
increases in fees than those not yet required. However, in all cases, company’s audit 
fees increased substantially whether required to comply with SOX Section 404 in 2004 
or 2005 (Foster et al., 2007).    
Millar and Bowen (2011) tested the effects of SOX on audit fees for fiscal years 
2002 through 2005, the AS2 era.  This study deviated from other studies in two distinct 
ways.  One, it examines data from fiscal years 2002 and 2003, which are pre-SOX 
compliance years.  Two, they differ in how they defined small and large firms.  Instead of 
using the more commonly accepted SEC designations of large accelerated filers and 
accelerated filers, they used Standard and Poor’s Smallcap 600 index designations for 
small and large firms.  This deviation reduces the comparability of this study with other 
studies, but it does provide insight into audit fee direction during this period.  The  
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empirical results derived in this study show that audit fees were statistically higher in 
the post-SOX period. 
 Acknowledging the difficulty in assessing the effect of SOX 404 due to 
confounding issues of financial, economic, and political changes as well as the lack of a 
control group, Iliev (2010) constructs a study using two groups and finds audit fees to be 
higher for the large accelerated filer group compared to the accelerated filer group.  
Later, he controls for size of the company, risk, and complexity, obtaining similar results. 
 In perhaps the most comprehensive study in the AS5 era, Krishnan, Krishnan, 
and Song (2011) actually compare audit fee changes using pre-AS5 data and post-AS5 
data.  While audit fees decreased in the first two years of AS5 compared to fees incurred 
during the AS2 era, only large firms experienced the reduction.  Smaller companies, 
which the PCAOB expected to benefit the most from the scaled approach implemented 
with AS5, experienced no significant reductions.   Wang & Zhou (2012) conduct a similar 
study using data for only the first year of the AS5 era.  They find audit fees decrease in 
the AS5 period compared to the AS2 period with no reduction in audit quality. 
 In 2012, the Financial Executives International Research Foundation conducted a 
survey of audit fees paid by a variety of U.S. companies.  Executives of 87 U.S. publicly-
held companies, 118 privately-held companies, and 16 non-profit companies responded  
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to the survey.  Although these companies represent a different cross-section of firms 
than other studies, their results are similar to results of studies consisting of only 
publicly traded companies and separated by market capitalization.  Results of the survey 
using 2012 data reveals total audit fees incurred by public firms, private firms, and 
nonprofit organizations increased by an average of four percent (Cohn, 2013).  As I do 
not intend to examine privately-held or non-profit companies, the data of interest from 
the FEI study comes from the 87 U.S. publicly-held companies.  Survey esults of this 
group reveals that 79 of these firms were classified as accelerated filers with 61 of those 
firms classified as large, accelerated filers.  Eight of the eighty-seven firms were 
classified as non-accelerated filers.  Of these 87 firms, audit fees for 2012 averaged $4.5 
million, with audit fees for large, accelerated filers leading the group at slightly more 
than $6.0 million.  This represents a four percent average increase from the prior year.   
The average tenure of auditors ranges from 7 years for the non-accelerated filers to 27 
years for the large, accelerated filers (FEI 2013 Survey). 
Hypotheses Development 
 As a result of the escalated audit cost associated with the implementation of SOX 
Section 404, the PCAOB amended AS2 (2004) by issuing AS5 (2007). The primary 
objective of the new guidance focuses on directing auditors’ attention on the most 
important matters in the audit of internal control over financial reporting and  
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
eliminating procedures that the Board believes are unnecessary to an effective audit of 
internal control. The proposals were designed to both increase the likelihood that 
material weaknesses in companies' internal control will be found before they cause 
material misstatement of the financial statements and steer the auditor away from 
procedures that are not necessary to achieve the intended benefits.  Selected language 
in AS5 was amended in 2010 when the PCAOB issued additional audit guidance 
pertaining to the auditor’s assessment of and response to the risks of material 
misstatements in an audit.   
The objective of steering auditors away from procedures not necessary to achieve the 
intended benefits should therefore reduce audit complexity and audit delay.  Based on 
the above reasoning, the first hypothesis is:  
H1: Audit delay decreased following the implementation of Auditing Standard 
No. 5 (AS5) for U.S. firms classified as large accelerated filers. 
H2: Audit delay decreased following the implementation of Auditing Standard 
No. 5 (AS5) for U.S. firms classified as accelerated filers. 
 In testing H1 and H2, this study determines if audit delay decreased following 
implementation of AS5. 
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Prior research on audit fees focused on determinants of audit cost, such as 
business risk, internal control strength, audit complexity, firm size, the firm conducting 
the audit, and amount of foreign assets (Thornton & Moore, 1993; Peel & Roberts, 
2003;  Foster et al., 2007).  The FEI survey results for 2012 reveal fee increases of 3 to 4 
percent, depending on firm classification (Cohn, 2013).  This study looks in particular at 
the absolute changes in dollar costs attributable to audit fees.  Recently research on this 
issue uses parameters differing from SEC definitions of accelerated and large 
accelerated filers (Millar & Bowen, 2011) but find similar results as studies using the 
prevailing definitions.  This study retains the SEC definitions of accelerated and large, 
accelerated filers thus contributing to the literature by maintaining an approach to the 
problem using accepted SEC definitions of accelerated and large accelerated filers.  Prior 
studies examine the regulatory significance, i.e., was the amount of change in dollar cost 
significant.  The objective of this study is to determine if audit fees have decreased as a 
result of AS5 implementation.  Therefore, this study tests the presumption that audit  
costs decreased as a result of AS5 implementation.  Based on the above reasoning, the 
second hypothesis is: 
H3: Audit fees decreased following the implementation of Auditing Standard No. 
5 for   U.S. firms classified as large accelerated filers. 
H4: Audit fees decreased following the implementation of Auditing Standard No. 
5 for U.S. firms classified as accelerated filers.  
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In testing H3 and H4, this study determines if audit fees decreased following 
implementation of AS5
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 Audit delay for large accelerated U.S. companies with calendar year ends 2007 to 
2013 will be examined, analyzed, and compared in this quantitative study following the 
implementation of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5).  Additionally, audit fees will be 
similarly examined. 
 In order to determine the effectiveness of AS5 in achieving its intended purpose, 
this study provides a rigorous examination of the association between audit delay and 
AS5 as well as the association between audit fees and AS5.  Based on prior research, this 
study hypothesizes decreased audit delay and audit fees are positively associated with 
AS5 implementation.  The research methods and design, sample, and regression models 
are presented followed by an explanation of the study’s operational variables.   
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Research Methods and Empirical Design 
This study utilizes a non-experimental, quantitative approach using regression 
analysis. Prior researchers routinely utilize regression analysis to predict audit delay and 
audit fees as well as examine their determinants (Ettredge et al. 2006, Impink et al. 
2011, Munsif et al. 2012, Iliev 2010, and Stanley 2011).  To examine the effect of AS5 on 
audit delay, I perform multiple regression analyses to compare the sample firms’ audit 
delays in 2007-2013 (AS5 era).  Due to the greater expected impact of AS5 on smaller 
firms, a sample is derived for firms defined as large accelerated filers and another 
sample consisting of accelerated filers.  The sample consists only of firms having a stable 
auditor-client relationship during the periods under examination.  Regression analysis is 
utilized to study the trend of audit delay and audit fee changes since the 
implementation of AS5 for large accelerated and accelerated firms subject to SOX 
Section 404 and having calendar year ends between 2007 and 2013.  Regression analysis 
is used to determine to what extent differences exist in SOX Section 404 audit delay and  
audit fees for large accelerated and accelerated U.S. companies subsequent to AS5 
implementation. 
 To test the audit delay hypothesis, I use an adaptation of the Ettredge et al., 
(2006) and Munsif et al., (2012) models. To test the audit fee hypothesis, I use an  
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adaptation of the Krishnan et al., (2011) and Millar & Bowen (2011) models.  Each of 
these models use control variables such as SEC designation, clean audit opinion, and  
stable auditor relationship as part of the audit delay and audit cost hypotheses tests.  
Audit delay and audit fees are computed using the secondary data found in the 
Compustat and Audit Analytics database. The data includes the time from the end of the 
accounting year to the time the audit report is issued for years 2007 to 2013 together 
with the audit fees charged by the external audit firm for the same years.  
 The first hypothesis evaluates the audit delay using data in the Compustat and 
Audit Analytics databases and follows the methodology employed by Ettredge et al., 
(2006).  This study contributes to the literature by extending the research to include the 
effects of AS5 and the further change by the SEC in 2006 reducing the filing deadline for 
large, accelerated filers’ 10-K reports from 75 to 60 days. 
 The second hypothesis uses audit fee data obtained from the Compustat and 
Audit Analytics databases and follows the methodology used by Krishnan et al., (2011) 
and Millar & Bowen (2011).  Expected methods of analyzing these data include multiple 
regression and trend analysis.  This study contributes to the literature by extending the 
research to include data through 2013, which adds five additional years of observations 
and results compared to prior studies.  Additionally, this study adds to the existing body 
of research by taking a comprehensive approach to the issues of audit delay and audit  
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costs by comparing yearly results from the AS5 without eliminating certain years as 
some studies do, and examining results of natural groupings such as pre and post AS5  
firms with same auditors, no internal control deficiencies, firms with internal control 
deficiencies, and accelerated or non-accelerated firms.  By extending the periods 
covered through 2013, this study will provide additional trend information on both audit 
delay and audit fees in the AS5 era.  
Sample and Data Sources 
 This study’s sample uses firm year observations from 2007-2013 derived from all 
firms that file Section 404 reports from January 2007 to December 2013 and that are 
covered by the Audit Analytics Database, which provides information about Section 404 
reports, auditor information, and audit report date.  Other financial data are obtained 
from the Compustat annual database. 
The necessary data to conduct this analysis are available through the Audit 
Analytics and Compustat databases.  The Compustat database is available through Nova  
Southeastern University.  Audit Analytics is available through Sam Houston State 
University.   
 In order to better isolate the effect of the regulatory change and to control for 
the effects of auditor shopping, this study more closely follows the approach of Krishnan  
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et al., 2011, wherein the sample is limited to only firms having a stable auditor 
relationship for the years of study.  Stable auditor relationships should remove some of  
the early delay and cost drivers such as learning new regulations, knowing how much 
manpower to provide to a particular audit engagement, and unfamiliarity with a client.  
Due in part to the scrutiny caused by the increased costs occurring under AS2 
regulation, any cost savings obtained under AS5 regulation are presumed to be passed 
on to the client.  The sample is a divided sample between large accelerated filers and 
accelerated filers during the years 2007 through 2013.  The data selection process 
identifies the number of U.S. public companies with calendar year end from 2007 
through 2013, adjusting for non-accelerated filers, financial institutions, firms not having 
the same auditor during the entire observation period, missing and multiple data.  Tests 
for multicollinearity will be performed as necessary.  
Operational Definition of Variables 
 SOX Section 404 Audit Delay. SOX Section 404 audit delay (AUDELAY), a 
dependent variable in this study, was used to address and answer research question 1: 
Do differences exist, and if so, to what extent, in SOS Section 404 audit delay for U.S. 
companies classified as large accelerated filers and also U.S. companies classified as 
accelerated filers with calendar year ends 2007-2013 subsequent to AS5 
implementation?  SOX Section 404 audit delay is measured as the time from a  
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company’s fiscal year end to the date the auditors sign their report. This study estimates 
the following audit delay model derived from the following classic multivariate  
regression audit delay model based on the prior research of Ettredge et al. (2006) and 
Munsif et al. (2012): 
Audit Delay Model 
 
Where: AUDELAY = the number of calendar days from a firm’s fiscal year-end to 
the date of the auditor’s report; 
  Model (1) is estimated using data for 2007 thru 2013 (AS5 era) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
AUDELAY = number of calendar days between fiscal year-end to date of the auditor’s 
report; a dependent variable (Audit Analytics [AA]). 
MWIC = 1 if there is a material weakness in internal controls, otherwise 0. This 
dichotomous control variable is a proxy for risk and financial factors. (AA) 
SIZE = The size of the firm, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. This 
control variable is a proxy for complexity. (Compustat) 
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HIGHTECH = 1 if client is in high tech industry, otherwise 0. This control variable is a 
proxy for complexity. (Compustat) 
ROA = Net earnings divided by total assets.  This control variable is a proxy for risk and 
financial factors. (Compustat) 
ADLEV = total debt divided by total assets.  This control variable is a proxy for risk and 
financial factors. (Compustat) 
GOCERN = 1 if firm receives a going concern opinion, otherwise 0. This dichotomous 
control variable is a proxy for risk and financial factors. (AA) 
EXT = 1 if firm reports an extraordinary item, otherwise 0. This dichotomous control 
variable is a proxy for risk and financial factors. (Compustat) 
SEGNUM = number of firm’s reportable segments. This control variable is a proxy for 
complexity. (Compustat) 
LOSS = 1 if firm reports negative earnings for the year, otherwise 0. This dichotomous 
control variable is a proxy for risk and financial factors. (Compustat) 
RESTATE = 1 if firm restated financial reports in the current year, otherwise 0. This 
dichotomous control variable is a proxy for risk and financial factors. (AA) 
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LAUDF - Natural log of audit fees in dollars.  This control variable is a proxy for 
complexity. (AA) 
AOPIN = 1 if auditor’s opinion on the financial statements for other than going concern, 
otherwise 0. This dichotomous control variable is a proxy for risk and financial factors. 
(AA) 
Audit Fee Model 
 This study utilizes an adaptation of the following classic, multivariate regression 
audit fee model based on prior research 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LAUDF = natural log of audit fees, in dollars; a dependent variable. (AA) 
ICW = 1 if the firm received an adverse opinion for material weaknesses in internal 
control, otherwise 0. This is a dichotomous control variable that is a proxy for risk and 
financial factors. (AA) 
BIG4 = 1 if firm audited by a big 4 auditor, otherwise 0.  This is a dichotomous control 
variable that is a proxy for auditor type. (AA) 
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LASSET = natural log of assets. This is a control variable that is a proxy for company size. 
(Compustat) 
MERGER = 1 if the firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition (identified by Compustat 
data item AQP or AQEPS, otherwise 0. This is a dichotomous control variable that is a 
proxy for complexity. (AA) 
MB = market-to-book ratio, defined as market value of equity divided by book value 
(from Compustat data item CEQ).  Market value of equity is defined as the firm’s price 
per share at fiscal year-end (from Compustat data item PRCC-F) multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding (from Compustat data item CSHO). This is a control 
variable that is a proxy for risk and financial factors. 
SEGSQRT = square root of the number of segments disclosed (Compustat Segment 
disclosure). This is a control variable that is a proxy for complexity. 
FOREIGN = 1 if the firm has foreign operations (from Compustat data item FCA), 
otherwise 0. This is a dichotomous control variable that is a proxy for complexity. 
RECINV = sum of firm’s receivables (Compustat data item RECT) and inventory (from 
Compustat data item INVT) divided by its total assets. This is a control variable that is a 
proxy for complexity. 
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AFLEV = firm’s total assets (from Compustat data item AT) less its book value (from 
Compustat data item CEQ) divided by its total assets. This is a control variable that is a 
proxy for risk and financial factors. 
SPECIAL = 1 if firm reports special items (from Compustat data item SPI), otherwise 0. 
This is a dichotomous control variable that is a proxy for risk and financial factors. 
RESTRUC = 1 if firm took a restructuring charge (from Compustat data item RCP or 
RCEPS), otherwise 0. This is a dichotomous control variable that is a proxy for risk and 
financial factors. 
GC = 1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion from its auditor, otherwise 0. This is a 
dichotomous control variable that is a proxy for risk and financial factors. 
ROA = firm’s return-on-assets ratio calculated as net income before extraordinary items 
(from Compustat data item IB) divided by beginning of year total assets (from 
Compustat data item AT), otherwise 0. This is a control variable that is a proxy for risk 
and financial factors. 
ROANEG = 1 if the firm’s ROA is negative, otherwise 0. This is a dichotomous control 
variable that is a proxy for risk and financial factors. (Compustat) 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
 
 In this chapter, the results and findings of the study outlined in Chapter III are 
presented and discussed.  The purpose of this study is to discover whether audit delay 
and audit fees decrease following the implementation of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5).  
This study focuses on United States publicly traded firms subject to the reporting 
provisions of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  The firms are further 
partitioned into two groups using the Securities and Exchange Commission criteria to 
classify firms as either large accelerated filers (LAF) or accelerated filers (AF).  This 
chapter describes the data collection process, the descriptive statistics of the variables 
in the study, and the results of the multiple regressions for each hypothesis.  Statistical 
techniques used to analyze the sample data of each filer group and interpret the 
empirical findings related to the hypotheses are presented.  The analyses and 
interpretation of the large accelerated filer findings for audit delay and audit fees are 
presented first, followed by those of the accelerated filers. 
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SPSS Version 23 for Windows is used for all data analyses.  Microsoft Excel is 
used to capture, organize and merge all Audit Analytics and Compustat data.  Pearson 
Correlation and multiple regression analysis is used to examine the strength of the 
independent variables in predicting audit delay and audit fees for both the large 
accelerated filer sample and the accelerated filer sample. 
Large Accelerated Filers 
Sample Selection 
 The analyses in this study are conducted for the seven-year period beginning 
with 2007 and ending with 2013.  The samples for this study consist of firms subject to 
AS5 and classified by the SEC as either a large accelerated filer or an accelerated filer.  
AS5 was effective for firms having a fiscal year end of November 15, 2007 or later.    The 
Audit Analytics database is used to search for U.S. firms which fit the SEC criteria as a 
large accelerated filer.  The initial sample extracted consists of 1792 unique firms which 
meet the definition of a large accelerated filer.  These firms are subjected to additional 
adjustments to help control for factors likely to affect audit delay and audit fees.  
Ettredge et al.(2006) found material weaknesses in internal control to be a major 
contributor to increased audit delay.  While some firms in the final sample of this study 
reported internal control weaknesses in one or more years, most quickly remediated 
the condition resulting in few observations of internal control weaknesses throughout  
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
 
the sample.  Unlike Krishnan et al., (2011), who separate their samples into “full” or 
“clean” samples, the final samples in this study are “full” samples for both LAFs and AFs, 
meaning the sample includes firms having internal control weaknesses.  Firms not 
having data in the Audit Analytics database for each of the seven years of the study 
were eliminated.  Next, firms were eliminated if they did not have the necessary 
financial statement variables in the Computstat data base.  To control for auditor 
shopping, firms not retaining the same auditor during the entire period of the study 
were omitted.  Finally, firms identified by their SIC code as operating in the financial 
industry were removed from the sample.  After eliminating all firms not having the 
necessary data, the final sample of large accelerated filers of 772 unique firms was 
obtained to test both the audit delay hypothesis and the audit fee hypothesis.   
According to the SEC, most U.S. publicly traded firms have a year-end in either 
December or January.  Audits performed during December and/or January are referred 
to as busy-season audits.  More than 95 percent of the sample firms have a fiscal year 
ending between December 1 and March 31, eliminating the need to control for non-
busy season audit engagements.  The sample selection process is summarized in Table 
1. 
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Table 1 
Large Accelerated Filers Sample Selection 
     Initial Sample of LAF Companies 
   
1,792 
      Less: Companies not having data in Audit 
Analytics for each year of study, 2007-2013 
   
-358 
      Less: Companies not having necessary 
financial statement data in Compustat 
   
-188 
      Less: Companies having financial sector SIC 
codes 
   
-212 
      Less: Companies changing external auditors 
during any year of the study, 2007-2013 
   
-262 
Final Full Sample 
   
772 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in testing audit 
delay for large accelerated filers.  These statistics include the minimum value, maximum 
value, means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis for the dependent and 
independent variables. 
 The sample of 5,378 observations of audit delay and other company data reveals 
a mean audit delay for large accelerated filers for the seven-year period of 55.11 days.  
This finding is consistent with Mitra et al., 2015, who find a mean of 57.75 days with 
their large accelerated filer sample.  Skewness values indicate normal symmetry of the  
distribution whereas kurtosis values indicate a sharply peaked distribution with long, 
thin tails. 
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Table 2 
Audit Delay Descriptive Statistics for Large Accelerated Filers 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Audit Delay 
(AUDELAY) 
5425 14 458 55.11 15.651 13.964 268.535 
Material Weakness 
(MWIC) 5426 0 12 .03 .306 20.840 602.792 
Firm size (SIZE) 5418 13.8165 27.6898 22.367024 1.3973502 .412 1.624 
High Tech Firm 
(HIGHTECH) 5426 0 1 .34 .474 .667 -1.556 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
5418 -15.2404 198.6693 .213638 5.3138386 35.768 1297.346 
Audit Delay Leverage 
(ADLEV) 5415 0.0000 116.6667 .269251 1.6022799 70.867 5146.815 
Going Concern 
(GOCERN) 5426 0 1 .00 .019 52.072 2710.499 
Extraordinary Item 
(EXT) 
5426 0 6 .01 .132 21.618 801.629 
Reporting Segments 
(SEGNUM) 5411 1 113 18.39 10.737 1.511 5.420 
Negative Earnings 
(LOSS) 
5426 0 1 .09 .293 2.772 5.688 
Restated Financials 
(RESTATE) 5426 0 1 .06 .243 3.591 10.898 
Audit Opinion (AOPIN) 5426 0 1 .01 .114 8.510 70.441 
Valid N (listwise) 5378             
 
LAF Audit Delay Variable Correlation 
 Correlation tests the strength and direction of two variables to each other.  
Regardless of the strength and direction, correlation does not necessarily imply 
causation.  Correlation coefficients range from -1.0, a perfectly negative relationship, to  
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+1.0, a perfectly positive relationship.   A Pearson Correlation was computed to assess 
the relationship between the independent variables.   The Pearson Correlation Matrix 
presented in Table 3 shows the correlation between the variables in the large 
accelerated filers.  The independent variables with the strongest bivariate relationship 
to audit delay are MWIC (material weaknesses in internal controls) at 0.389 and AOPIN 
(audit opinion) at 0.292.  The strongest correlation coefficient among the independent 
variables is 0.721 between MWIC (material weaknesses in internal control) and AOPIN 
(audit opinion).  This correlation is consistent with results from prior studies that the 
presence of material weaknesses in internal control increases audit risk thus requiring 
more time to complete the audit (Ettredge et al. 2006 and Mitra et al. 2016).  The next 
highest correlation coefficient is 0.508 between SIZE (firm size) and AUDF (the natural 
log of audit fees).  These findings suggest that firms with material weaknesses in internal 
controls and larger firms experience longer audit delay and that larger firms experience 
higher audit fees.  All correlation coefficients fall within acceptable limits of -1.0 and 
+1.0.   
Multicollinearity and VIF 
 Results of multicollinearity and VIF tests are presented in Table 4.  
Multicollinearity refers to the correlation, or linear association, between two 
independent variables.  When independent variables exhibit a strong mutual  
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correlation, it suggests one or more of the variables does not make a significant 
contribution in determining the dependent variable.  To test for multicollinearity, two 
tests are performed on the independent variables.  First, the tolerance of each variable 
is derived.  Tolerance measures the strength of the linear association between the 
independent variables and indicates the amount of variability of a particular 
independent variable that is not explained by any of the other independent variables.  It 
is calculated by subtracting the proportion of a variable’s variance explained by each of 
the other independent variables from 1.  High tolerance values, those close to 1 and 
indicate little collinearity whereas tolerance values closer to 0 indicate the variable is 
almost entirely accounted for by the other independent variables.  Tolerance values 
range from .478 (AOPIN) to .992 (GOCERN).  All independent variables except MWIC, 
SIZE, LAUDF, and AOPIN are above normal tolerance values of 0.70
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix for Audit Delay LAF 
 
  AUDELAY MWIC SIZE HIGHTECH ROA ADLEV GOCERN EXT SEGNUM LOSS RESTATE LAUDF AOPIN 
AUDELAY Pearson Correlation 1                         
Sig. (2-tailed)                           
N 5425                         
MWIC Pearson Correlation .389** 1                       
Sig. (2-tailed) .000                         
N 5425 5426                       
SIZE Pearson Correlation -.087** -.010 1                     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .468                       
N 5417 5418 5418                     
HIGHTECH Pearson Correlation -.007 .033* -.029* 1                   
Sig. (2-tailed) .610 .016 .034                     
N 5425 5426 5418 5426                   
ROA Pearson Correlation .008 -.003 -.177** -.020 1                 
Sig. (2-tailed) .538 .817 .000 .132                   
N 5417 5418 5418 5418 5418                 
ADLEV Pearson Correlation .004 .004 -.065** -.021 -.044** 1               
Sig. (2-tailed) .777 .795 .000 .120 .001                 
N 5414 5415 5415 5415 5415 5415               
GOCERN Pearson Correlation .010 -.002 .015 .027* -.001 .003 1             
Sig. (2-tailed) .448 .905 .273 .050 .954 .798               
N 5425 5426 5418 5426 5418 5415 5426             
EXT Pearson Correlation -.007 -.003 .043** -.057** -.003 .007 .071** 1           
Sig. (2-tailed) .595 .811 .001 .000 .812 .584 .000             
N 5425 5426 5418 5426 5418 5415 5426 5426           
SEGNUM Pearson Correlation -.034* .010 .271** .088** -.035* -.023 -.001 .005 1         
Sig. (2-tailed) .012 .472 .000 .000 .010 .091 .959 .699           
N 5410 5411 5403 5411 5403 5400 5411 5411 5411         
LOSS Pearson Correlation .033* .061** -.013 .022 -.020 .056** .027* -.006 -.013 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .015 .000 .354 .104 .138 .000 .050 .664 .349         
N 5425 5426 5418 5426 5418 5415 5426 5426 5411 5426       
RESTATE Pearson Correlation .031* .040** .011 -.036** -.008 .000 .034* .005 .020 .038** 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .021 .003 .404 .009 .544 .971 .011 .727 .142 .005       
N 5425 5426 5418 5426 5418 5415 5426 5426 5411 5426 5426     
LAUDF Pearson Correlation -.027 .053** .507** .065** -.063** -.002 .015 .008 .326** -.001 .023 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .051 .000 0.000 .000 .000 .902 .264 .571 .000 .956 .084     
N 5425 5426 5418 5426 5418 5415 5426 5426 5411 5426 5426 5426   
AOPIN Pearson Correlation .292** .721** -.009 .015 -.004 .003 -.002 .002 .002 .067** .069** .048** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 0.000 .487 .273 .757 .825 .870 .911 .867 .000 .000 .000   
N 5425 5426 5418 5426 5418 5415 5426 5426 5411 5426 5426 5426 5426 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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 with SIZE and LAUDF extremely close with values of 0.698 and 0.697, respectively.  
Second, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is another measure of multicollinearity.  The 
VIF is the inverse of the tolerance, meaning higher values of VIF indicate high correlation 
among variables.  A standard of 4 is often used to measure VIF, suggesting VIF values 
less than 4.0 indicate low degrees of multicollinearity.  All VIF values for audit delay 
independent variables in the large accelerated filer sample are below this level, again 
suggesting multicollinearity is not likely an issue with the LAF audit delay study.   
Table 4 
Multicollinearity of Independent Variables for LAF Audit Delay 
  
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)     
MWIC .479 2.087 
SIZE .698 1.433 
HIGHTECH .976 1.025 
ROA .963 1.038 
ADLEV .987 1.013 
GOCERN .992 1.008 
EXT .990 1.011 
SEGNUM .873 1.146 
LOSS .989 1.011 
RESTATE .990 1.010 
LAUDF .697 1.435 
AOPIN .478 2.092 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
 
LAF Audit Delay Regression Analysis 
Model Summary 
 Table 5 presents the R values and the standard error of the estimate, all values 
commonly presented to indicate the predictive value of the model.  The R square value 
of 0.160 indicates how much of the variance in the dependent variable (AUDELAY) is 
explained by the model.  Although mainly reported when a sample is considered small, 
the adjusted R square is presented here as well.  Adjusted R square values provide a 
better estimate of the variance when small samples are involved.  When samples are 
large, as in this study, little difference exists between R square and adjusted R square 
values.  This R square suggests a weak relationship between audit delay and these 
control variables. 
 Multiple regression analysis was used to predict the dependent variable, 
AUDELAY (Audit Delay).  Hypothesis one test the association of audit delay with multiple 
control variables.    The R square value presented in Table 6 indicates a value of .160, 
which is the R value or correlation coefficient squared.  Further, the adjusted R square 
represents a weak, although positive and linear, association between audit delay and 
the independent variables used in this model, as only 16.0% of the total variation in 
audit delay explained by the independent variables. This value is less than the value of  
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0.31 (31 percent) obtained by Mitra et al., 2015 in their large accelerated filer sample.  
However, their study performed a comparison of audit delay between periods of AS2  
and AS5.  The mean result of 55.11 days for the seven-year period of this study does 
however correspond to their result of large accelerated filers having a clean opinion of 
55.88 days.   
Anova 
The Anova analysis provides the statistical test for the overall model fit in terms 
of the F ratio.  The F test is a test of overall significance.  That is, it determines whether a 
significant relationship exists between the dependent variable and all of the 
independent variables.   
Table 5 
LAF Audit Delay Regression Model Summary 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .400a .160 .158 14.393 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Audit Opinion (AOPIN), Extraordinary Item (EXT), Return on 
Assets (ROA), Reporting Segments (SEGNUM), Audit Delay Leverage (ADLEV), 
Going Concern (GOCERN), Restated Financials (RESTATE), Negative Earnings 
(LOSS), High Tech Firm (HIGHTECH), Firm size (SIZE), Log of Audit Fee (LAUDF), 
Material Weakness (MWIC) 
b. Dependent Variable: Audit Delay (AUDELAY) 
 
Table 6 presents the Anova table used to test if a linear relationship exists 
between the variables by forming an F ratio of the mean square of the regression to the  
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residual mean square and a test of the coefficients of regression analysis between 
variables.  The p-value of .000 is less than the alpha of .05 and the null hypothesis is  
rejected.  Alternatively, SPSS calculates an F statistic of 85.332.  With 12 degrees of 
freedom in the numerator and 5386 degrees of freedom in the denominator, F.05 equals 
1.7522.  The F statistic of 85.332 is greater than 1.7522, therefore the null hypothesis is 
rejected and I conclude that audit delay decreased following the implementation of AS5 
for large accelerated filers.   
Table 6 
LAF Audit Delay Anova Analysis 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 212113.052 12 17676.088 85.332 .000b 
Residual 1115687.046 5386 207.146     
Total 1327800.099 5398       
 
Regression Coefficients 
 In order to evaluate the relative contribution of each independent variable in 
predicting the dependent variable, I examine the standardized coefficients and report 
these results in Table 7. Standardizing the coefficients converts each independent 
variable to the same scale to easily compare the contribution of each.  MWIC makes the 
strongest unique contribution to explain the dependent variable with a coefficient of  
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0.373 followed by SIZE with a coefficient of -0.080.  With a significance value less than 
.05, these two independent variables make a significant unique contribution to the  
prediction of the dependent variable.  All remaining independent variables make 
minimal contributions and none are significant at the .05 level. 
Table 7 
LAF Audit Delay Coefficient Regression Results H1 
Variable Coefficients t-value Significance 
(Constant)   22.546 .000 
MWIC .373 20.682 .000 
SIZE -.080 -5.344 .000 
HIGHTECH -.021 -1.638 .101 
ROA -.005 -.430 .667 
ADLEV -.004 -.333 .739 
GOCERN .012 .986 .324 
EXT -.005 -.365 .715 
SEGNUM -.014 -1.077 .282 
LOSS .007 .541 .588 
RESTATE .015 1.156 .248 
LAUDF -.002 -.110 .913 
AOPIN .021 1.161 .246 
R  .400 
R2  .160 
F  85.332 
Significance .000 
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Based on the coefficient values, variables in the model explain only 0.160 or 16 
percent of the audit delay for the LAF population.  Since this analysis is based on models 
developed by earlier researchers (Ettredge et al., 2006 and Mitra et al., 2015),  
sequential or combinatorial approaches omitting potential noncontributing independent 
variables was not employed to enhance the model predictability or explanation. 
LAF Audit Fees 
 
 The sample selected for large accelerated filers was used to test the hypotheses 
of both audit delay and audit fees over the period of the study.  No further elimination 
processes were applied to the sample derived in the audit delay analyses for large 
accelerated filers and we proceed with the analyses. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics for the audit fee model variables.  
Unlike the audit delay model, where the number or quantity of instances of material 
internal control weaknesses are reported, the audit fee model reports only the presence 
of material internal control weaknesses through the independent variable ICW.  Of the 
LAFs, only 0.01 exhibit ICWs throughout the entire seven-year period of the study, 
perhaps because most firms are quick to remediate such issues.  Some 0.98 of these 
firms utilize the services of auditors classified as a big four auditor (BIG4).  Another item 
of note, no firms in the sample were issued going concern opinions.  Due to the large  
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standard deviation, the mean of audit fees as estimated by the model is presented in 
natural log format.  Transformed into dollars, the mean of audit fees for large 
accelerated filers is $4,995,000. 
Table 8 
LAF Audit Fee Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Log of Audit Fee 
(LAUDF) 
5426 0.0000 8.2098 6.433099 .5927829 -4.778 51.716 
IC Weakness 5426 0 1 .01 .113 8.635 72.595 
Big 4 Auditor 
(BIG4) 
5426 0 1 .98 .128 -7.528 54.695 
Log of Assets  
(LASSET) 
5426 0.0000 12.0255 9.699553 .7118148 -3.434 50.360 
Engaged in 
Merger 
(MERGER) 
5426 0 1 .24 .425 1.243 -.455 
Market to Book 
Ratio (MB) 
5420 -
22402.0550 
3247.0374 3.292729 337.6263953 -52.995 3590.416 
Rec and Inv 
percent of assets 
(RECINV) 
5407 0.0000 453.1359 .722403 10.0107986 36.501 1429.378 
Audit Fee 
Leverage  
(AFLEV) 
5420 0.0000 3.1043 .779220 .2981675 .620 2.515 
Special Items 
Reported  
(SPECIAL) 
5426 0 1 .98 .125 -7.755 58.164 
Restructure 
Charge  
(RESTRUCTURE) 
5426 0 1 .39 .488 .443 -1.805 
Going 
Concern(GC) 
5426 0 1 .00 .019 52.072 2710.499 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
5418 -15.2404 198.6693 .213638 5.3138386 35.768 1297.346 
Negative ROA 
(ROANEG 
5418 0 1 .09 .292 2.777 5.713 
Valid N (listwise) 5403             
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Correlations 
Pearson correlations for audit fee variables for large accelerated filers are 
presented in Table 9.  These correlations are computed to assess the relationship 
between independent variables and with the dependent variable.  LASSET (natural log of 
total assets) has the strongest bivariate relationship with the dependent variable 
(LAUDF).  Results for the control variables are consistent with prior research wherein 
larger firms (LASSET), BIG 4 auditors (BIG$), firms with greater inventories and 
receivables (RECINV), and restructuring (RESTRUC) are associated with increases in audit 
fees.  LASSET, AFLEV, and RESTRUCTURE correlate substantially with the dependent 
variable LAUDF (.426, .255, and .239, respectively).  All bivariate correlations are within 
acceptable ranges with several independent variables showing strong correlations with 
other independent variables. 
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Table 9 
Pearson Correlation for LAF Audit Fee Variables 
 
  LAUDF BIG4 LASSET MERGER MB RECINV AFLEV SPECIAL RESTRUCTURE GC ROA ROANEG ICW 
LAUDF   1                         
Sig. (2-tailed)                           
N 5426                         
BIG4   .102** 1                       
Sig. (2-tailed) .000                         
N 5426 5426                       
LASSET   .426** .051** 1                     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000                       
N 5426 5426 5426                     
MERGER   .129** .032* .083** 1                   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .018 .000                     
N 5426 5426 5426 5426                   
MB   -.015 .000 -.048** .013 1                 
Sig. (2-tailed) .268 .988 .000 .344                   
N 5420 5420 5420 5420 5420                 
RECINV   -.045** .007 -.098** -.024 .087** 1               
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .631 .000 .080 .000                 
N 5407 5407 5407 5407 5405 5407               
AFLEV   .255** .059** .241** .194** -.027* -.023 1             
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .043 .098               
N 5420 5420 5420 5420 5418 5407 5420             
SPECIAL   -.046** -.017 -.068** .015 .001 .006 -.012 1           
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .222 .000 .271 .968 .665 .381             
N 5426 5426 5426 5426 5420 5407 5420 5426           
RESTRUCTURE   .239** .058** .114** .201** .001 .002 .239** .011 1         
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .921 .892 .000 .409           
N 5426 5426 5426 5426 5420 5407 5420 5426 5426         
GC   .015 .003 .013 -.011 .000 -.001 .017 .002 .024 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .264 .853 .336 .432 .989 .939 .217 .858 .078         
N 5426 5426 5426 5426 5420 5407 5420 5426 5426 5426       
ROA   -.063** .004 -.177** -.017 .209** .302** -.059** .004 -.025 -.001 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .796 .000 .211 .000 .000 .000 .784 .065 .954       
N 5418 5418 5418 5418 5416 5405 5418 5418 5418 5418 5418     
ROANEG   -.001 -.022 -.013 -.001 .003 -.013 .063** .011 .100** .027* -.020 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .953 .110 .335 .929 .828 .326 .000 .432 .000 .050 .138     
N 5418 5418 5418 5418 5416 5405 5418 5418 5418 5418 5418 5418   
ICW   .049** .002 -.006 .006 .001 .046** .032* -.038** .022 -.002 -.004 .069** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .871 .644 .676 .970 .001 .019 .005 .106 .872 .759 .000   
N 5426 5426 5426 5426 5420 5407 5420 5426 5426 5426 5418 5418 5426 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Multicollinearity and VIF 
 Collinearity statistics are presented in Table 10.  All independent variables are 
above normal tolerance values of 0.70.  All VIF values for audit fee independent 
variables in the LAF sample are below 4.0, suggesting that neither VIR or tolerance 
values indicate no multicollinearity issues present in the independent variables. 
Table 10 
LAF Audit Fee Collinearity Statistics 
 
 
 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
  
ICW .988 1.012 
BIG4 .991 1.009 
LASSET .867 1.153 
MERGER .929 1.076 
MB .955 1.047 
SEGSQRT .807 1.240 
FOREIGN .877 1.140 
RECINV .903 1.108 
AFLEV .867 1.154 
SPECIAL .988 1.012 
RESTRUCTURE .832 1.201 
GC .998 1.002 
ROA .854 1.171 
ROANEG .978 1.023 
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Model Summary 
Table 11 presents the R results of the audit fee model for LAFs.  The R square 
value of .289 indicates how much of the variance in the dependent variable LAUDF 
(natural log of audit fees) is explained by the model.  Although not an especially strong R 
square value, .289 represents a positive and linear relationship between LAUDF and the 
independent variables used in this model.  This R square value is less than that obtained 
in the Krishnan et al. (2011) study, their R squares of .79 and .81 result from a different 
configuration of the sample.  They combined all LAF and AF firms into one sample then 
separated out a subset sample of firms having clean audit opinions as they were testing 
more for the effect of the audit opinion on firms, whereas this study uses virtually the 
same model but separates the sample into LAFs and AFs.   
Table 11 
    LAF Audit Fee Regression Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .538a .289 .288 .5003566 
 
Anova 
 The Anova analysis provides the statistical test for the overall model fit in terms 
of the F ratio.  The F test is a test of overall significance.  That is, it determines whether a  
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significant relationship exists between the dependent variable and all of the 
independent variables.   
Table 12 presents the Anova table used to test if a linear relationship exists 
between the variables by forming an F ratio of the mean square of the regression to the 
residual mean square and a test of the coefficients of regression analysis between 
variables.  Using the p-value approach, the rejection rule is to reject H3 if the p-value is 
less than or equal to 0. The p-value of .000 is less than the alpha of .05 and the null 
hypothesis is rejected.  Alternatively, SPSS calculates an F statistic of 155.565.  With 14 
degrees of freedom in the numerator and 5348 degrees of freedom in the denominator, 
F.05 equals 1.6950.  The F statistic of 155.565 is greater than 1.6950, therefore the null 
hypothesis is rejected and conclude that audit fees decreased following the 
implementation of AS5 for large accelerated filers.   
                                                                         Table 12 
LAF Audit Fee ANOVA Analysis 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 545.254 14 38.947 155.565 .000b 
Residual 1338.908 5348 .250     
Total 1884.161 5362       
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Coefficient of Regressions Results H2 
 Regression coefficients provide a way to evaluate the relative contribution of 
each independent variable in predicting the dependent variable.  Coefficients are 
standardized or converted to the same scale to make easy comparison.  LASSET (natural  
log of assets), with a coefficient of .334, makes the strongest unique contribution to 
explaining the dependent variable.  Other independent variables making contributions 
include SEGSQRT (square root of number of entity reporting segments) with a 
coefficient of .202 and AFLEV (the entity’s total debt divided by its total assets) with a 
coefficient of .129.  With a significance value less than .05, each of these independent 
variables make a significant unique contribution of the dependent variable.  All other 
remaining variables make minimal contributions. 
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Table 13 
LAF Audit Fee Regression Analysis 
  
t-value Significance Variable 
Coefficie
nts 
(Constant)  22.766 .000 
ICW .040 3.487 .000 
BIG4 .058 4.992 .000 
LASSET .334 27.006 .000 
MERGER .031 2.604 .009 
MB .002 .168 .867 
SEGSQRT .202 15.772 .000 
FOREIGN .074 6.039 .000 
RECINV -.016 -1.280 .201 
AFLEV .129 10.422 .000 
SPECIAL -.005 -.466 .641 
RESTRUCTURE .089 7.081 .000 
GC .007 .614 .539 
ROA .020 1.637 .102 
ROANEG -.010 -.832 .405 
 
R = .538 
R2 = .289 
F = 155.565 
Significance = .000 
 
   
 
Based upon the coefficient values, the variables in the model explain only 0.289 
or 28.9 percent of the audit fee population for large accelerated filers.  Since this 
analysis is based on models developed by earlier researchers (Krishnan et al., 2011) 
sequential or combinatorial approaches omitting potential noncontributing independent 
variables was not employed to enhance the model predictability or explanation. 
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Accelerated Filers 
 Policymaking organizations, in particular the PCAOB, expected AS5 to have a 
greater benefit on smaller, less complex firms as compared to larger, more complex 
firms.  The primary reason for this expectation was the ability of the auditors to scale 
the audit under the more relaxed provisions of AS5. 
Sample Selection 
 The selection process used to derive the sample for accelerated filers analyses 
followed the same steps as those used to derive the sample for large accelerated filers 
with one exception.  The Audit Analytics database search criteria could not be set to 
directly select firms classified as accelerated filers using market capitalization dollar 
amounts.  Audit Analytics stratified its dollar amounts at greater than $70M or greater 
than $80M, whereas the SEC defines an accelerated filer as having a market 
capitalization of greater than $75M.  Therefore, it was necessary to initially select firms 
having market caps as low as $70M and then using the sort procedure in Excel to 
identify those firms having a market cap of less than $75M and remove them from the 
sample.  Otherwise, the sample selection process was identical to that used for large 
accelerated filers.  Table 14 presents the sample selection process. 
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Table 14 
Sample Selection 
    Initial Sample of LAF Companies 
  
1,195 
        Less: Companies not having data in 
Audit Analytics for each year of study, 2007-
2013 
  
-294 
       Less: Companies not having necessary 
financial statement data in Compustat 
  
-206 
        Less: Companies having financial sector 
SIC codes 
  
-258 
        Less: Companies changing external 
auditors during any year of the study, 2007-
2013 
  
-194 
        Less: Companies not meeting minimum 
capitalization requirement for AF 
  
-9 
Final Full Sample for AFs (Unique Companies) 
  
234 
 
AF Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 15 presents the descriptive statistics for the accelerated filer sample for 
the seven-year period of the study.  Mean audit delay for these smaller firms is 69.29 
days which again, is consistent with the findings of Mitra et al, (2015).  Forty-seven 
percent of the AF firms are classified as high-tech, compared to thirty-four percent of 
LAF firms.  Whereas only nine percent of the LAF firms report losses, thirty-two percent 
of AF firms report losses.  Leverage, computed as total debt divided by total assets, is  
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less with AF firms (17.8%) compared to LAF firms (26.9%), indicating less reliance on 
debt in the capital structure. 
Table 15 
AF Audit Delay Model Descriptive Statistics 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Audit Delay (AUDELAY) 1639 23 369 69.29 23.567 7.396 72.037 
Material Weakness 
(MWIC) 
1639 0 1 .05 .209 4.352 16.957 
Firm Size (SIZE) 1632 15.0926 24.7315 19.515758 1.0155286 .391 3.829 
HighTech Firm 
(HIGHTECH) 
1639 0 11 .47 .562 4.102 73.065 
Return on Assets (ROA) 1632 -2.6986 7.7238 .015153 .3701398 10.893 200.711 
Audit Delay Leverage 
(ADLEV) 
1632 0.0000 10.7217 .178168 .4885494 12.316 219.548 
Going Concern 
(GOCERN) 
1639 0 1 .00 .049 20.187 405.994 
Extraordinary Item (EXT) 1639 0 1 .00 .035 28.601 816.995 
Reporting Segments 
(SEGNUM) 
1626 0 80 12.25 8.684 2.180 10.625 
Negative Earnings 
(LOSS) 
1639 0 1 .32 .465 .789 -1.379 
Restated Financials 
(RESTATE) 
1639 0 1 .04 .194 4.764 20.717 
Audit Opinion (AOPIN) 1639 0 1 .02 .147 6.529 40.678 
Valid N (listwise) 1619             
 
AF Audit Delay Variable Correlation 
 A Pearson correlation was computed to assess the relationship between the 
independent variables.  Correlations between the variables for the AFs are presented in 
Table 16.  As with the LAFs, the independent variable with the strongest bivariate  
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relationship to audit delay is MWIC (material weaknesses in internal controls, although 
the correlation for AFs was half as strong (.192 to .389).  As with the LAFs, MWIC and  
AOPIN exhibit the strongest relationship among independent variables at .664.  Other 
strong correlations exist between AOPIN and RESTATE at .163 and AOPIN and COCERN 
at .161.  These results suggest that AFs having material weaknesses in internal controls 
also tend to restate their financial statements and have going concern issues. 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
Table 16 
AF Audit Delay Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variable   AUDELAY MWIC SIZE HIGHTECH ROA ADLEV GOCERN EXT SEGNUM LOSS RESTATE AOPIN 
AUDELAY   1                       
Sig. (2-tailed)                         
N 1639                       
MWIC   .192** 1                     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000                       
N 1639 1639                     
SIZE   -.004 .003 1                   
Sig. (2-tailed) .877 .906                     
N 1632 1632 1632                   
HIGHTECH   -.041 .016 -.236** 1                 
Sig. (2-tailed) .099 .529 .000                   
N 1639 1639 1632 1639                 
ROA   .015 -.035 -.102** -.079** 1               
Sig. (2-tailed) .551 .163 .000 .001                 
N 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632               
ADLEV   .094** .124** .007 -.129** .011 1             
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .789 .000 .643               
N 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632             
GOCERN   .013 .048 -.012 .003 -.067** .023 1           
Sig. (2-tailed) .598 .050 .617 .906 .007 .358             
N 1639 1639 1632 1639 1632 1632 1639           
EXT   .002 -.008 .007 .002 .005 .016 -.002 1         
Sig. (2-tailed) .942 .757 .773 .933 .852 .522 .944           
N 1639 1639 1632 1639 1632 1632 1639 1639         
SEGNUM   .021 .012 .092** .153** -.017 -.025 -.020 .045 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .386 .629 .000 .000 .502 .308 .419 .067         
N 1626 1626 1619 1626 1619 1619 1626 1626 1626       
LOSS   .003 .064** -.116** .090** -.346** .041 .073** -.024 -.017 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .907 .009 .000 .000 .000 .100 .003 .336 .505       
N 1639 1639 1632 1639 1632 1632 1639 1639 1626 1639     
RESTATE   .009 .167** -.007 .012 -.065** .020 .054* -.007 -.003 .059* 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .703 .000 .786 .630 .009 .414 .029 .776 .899 .017     
N 1639 1639 1632 1639 1632 1632 1639 1639 1626 1639 1639   
AOPIN   .050* .664** .016 .001 -.032 -.004 .161** -.005 -.040 .068** .163** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .044 .000 .517 .953 .190 .874 .000 .832 .103 .006 .000   
N 1639 1639 1632 1639 1632 1632 1639 1639 1626 1639 1639 1639 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Multicollinearity and VIF 
 In Table 17, we see tolerance values range from .527 to .997 with all 
independent variables except MWIC, SIZE, LAUDF, and AOPIN having values above 0.70.  
All VIF values are less than 4.0.  Together, the results of these two tests suggest 
multicollinearity is not an issue with the AFs audit delay model.   
Table 17 
AF Audit Delay Collinearity Statistics 
  
 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)     
MWIC .532 1.881 
SIZE .612 1.634 
HIGHTECH .872 1.147 
ROA .847 1.181 
ADLEV .948 1.055 
GOCERN .959 1.043 
EXT .997 1.003 
SEGNUM .906 1.104 
LOSS .826 1.211 
RESTATE .961 1.041 
LAUDF .614 1.628 
AOPIN .527 1.899 
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Model Summary 
Table 18 presents the R values and standard error of the estimate.  The R square 
value indicates only 5.5 percent of the variance in the dependent variable AUDELAY is 
explained by this set of independent variables.  Similar to the result for LAFs, this result 
is somewhat weak (<.30).  However, the results are consistent with those of Mitra et al., 
2015, who report R squares of 0.31 and 0.21, respectively, in their LAF and AF samples. 
Table 18 
AF Audit Delay Regression Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 
.234a .055 .047 23.001 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Audit Opinion (AOPIN), HighTech Firm (HIGHTECH), Extraordinary 
Item (EXT), Return on Assets (ROA), Audit Delay Leverage (ADLEV), Reporting Segments 
(SEGNUM), Going Concern (GOCERN), Restated Financials (RESTATE), Firm Size (SIZE), 
Negative Earnings (LOSS), Log of Audit Fees (LAUDF), Material Weakness (MWIC) 
b. Dependent Variable: Audit Delay (AUDELAY) 
 
Anova 
 The Anova analysis provides the statistical test for the overall model fit in terms 
of the F ratio.  The F test is a test of overall significance.  That is, it determines whether a 
significant relationship exists between the dependent variable and all of the 
independent variables.   
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Table 19 presents the Anova table used to test if a linear relationship exists 
between the variables by forming an F ratio of the mean square of the regression to the 
residual mean square and a test of the coefficients of regression analysis between 
variables.  Using the p-value approach, the rejection rule is to reject H2 if the p-value is 
less than or equal to 0. The p-value of .000 is less than the alpha of .05 and the null 
hypothesis is rejected.  Alternatively, SPSS calculates an F statistic of 7.694.  With 12 
degrees of freedom in the numerator and 1600 degrees of freedom in the denominator, 
F.05 equals 1.7522.  The F statistic of 7.694 is greater than 1.7522, therefore the null 
hypothesis is rejected and I conclude that audit delay decreased following the 
implementation of AS5 for accelerated filers.    
                                                                            Table 19 
AF Audit Delay ANOVA Analysis 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 48843.743 12 4070.312 7.694 .000b 
Residual 846491.022 1600 529.057          
Total 895334.765 1612         
a. Dependent Variable: Audit Delay (AUDELAY) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Audit Opinion (AOPIN), HighTech Firm (HIGHTECH), Extraordinary Item (EXT), Return 
on Assets (ROA), Audit Delay Leverage (ADLEV), Reporting Segments (SEGNUM), Going Concern (GOCERN), 
Restated Financials (RESTATE), Firm Size (SIZE), Negative Earnings (LOSS), Log of Audit Fees (LAUDF), 
Material Weakness (MWIC) 
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AF Audit Delay Coefficient of Regressions Results H2a 
 Table 20 presents the standardized coefficients of each independent variable.  As 
with the LAFs, MWIC makes the strongest unique contribution to explaining the  
dependent variable with a standardized coefficient of .275.  Thus, as audit delay 
increases in the AFs, the presence of MWIC would increase as well.  AOPIN, with a 
negative standardized coefficient of -.134, also makes a strong unique contribution, 
suggesting as audit delay increases, the likelihood of an adverse audit opinion increases. 
Table 20 
AF Audit Delay Coefficient of Regression Results H1 
Variables Coefficients t-value Significance 
(Constant)   5.119 .000 
MWIC .275 8.240 .000 
SIZE -.029 -.923 .356 
HIGHTECH -.046 -1.771 .077 
ROA .016 .618 .537 
ADLEV .055 2.190 .029 
GOCERN .022 .879 .380 
EXT .002 .065 .948 
SEGNUM .018 .694 .488 
LOSS -.004 -.167 .867 
RESTATE -.016 -.664 .507 
LAUDF .027 .871 .384 
AOPIN -.134 -4.005 .000 
R = .234 
R2 = .055 
F =7.694 
Significance = .000 
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Based upon the coefficient values, the variables in the model explain only 0.055 
or 5.5 percent of the audit delay for the accelerated filer population.  Since this analysis 
is based on models developed by earlier researchers (Ettredge et al. 2006 and Mitra et  
al. 2016), sequential or combinatorial approaches omitting potential noncontributing 
independent variables was not employed to enhance the model predictability or 
explanation. 
Accelerated Filers 
Audit Fee 
 Following the model established by Krishnan et al., (2011), we test to determine 
if audit fees decreased during the period 2007-2013.  Unlike Krishnan et al (2011), we do 
not focus on how the presence of internal control weaknesses (ICW) impact audit fees 
by dividing our sample into a “full” sample, one containing firms with and without ICW 
and a “clean” sample, one without ICW.  Instead, our approach seeks to determine the 
effect of AS5 using just the “full” sample approach.  Also, by maintaining the firm-
auditor relationship over the period of the study, the effect of AS5 is isolated as the 
relationship serves as its own control.  Other independent variables serve as proxies for 
factors identified in prior studies that represent audit effort, such as firm complexity, 
firm performance, and auditor type.  FOREIGN and SEGSQRT proxy for firm complexity  
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(Francis et al., 2005) whereas BIG4 serves as a proxy for auditor reputation (Palmrose, 
1986). 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for accelerated filers audit fees are presented in Table 21.  
Usual statistics are presented such as means, minimum and maximum values, standard 
deviation, skewness, and kurtosis.  Due to the large standard deviation, the mean of 
audit fees as estimated by the model is presented in natural log format.  Transformed 
into dollars, the mean of audit fees for accelerated filers is $1,034,000.  Seventy-four 
percent of AFs hire a big accounting firm to conduct their annual audit.  Fifty-three 
percent report special items and thirty-one percent report negative return on assets. 
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Table 21 
AF Audit Fee Model Descriptive Statistics 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
LAUDF 1630 10.9662 17.9379 13.457206 .6783221 -.146 2.214 
ICW 1643 0 1 .04 .203 4.497 18.245 
BIG4 1643 0 1 .74 .441 -1.067 -.862 
LASSET 1636 15.0926 24.7315 19.516319 1.0261175 .395 3.936 
MERGER 1643 0 1 .16 .364 1.887 1.563 
MB 
1621 
-
9894.8064 
4783.2792 8.010972 332.8144264 -10.655 554.258 
SEGSQRT 1643 0.0000 8.9443 3.253340 1.2498788 .046 1.511 
FOREIGN 1643 0 1 .19 .396 1.548 .396 
RECINV 1634 0.0000 20.8960 .264991 .8296343 19.073 417.376 
AFLEV 1636 .0051 2.7998 .614129 .3261175 .796 1.902 
SPECIAL 1643 0 1 .53 .499 -.140 -1.983 
RESTRUC 1643 0 1 .22 .413 1.372 -.117 
GC 1643 0 1 .01 .082 12.109 144.814 
ROA 1636 -2.6986 7.7238 .017470 .3801448 10.522 184.200 
ROANEG 1636 0 1 .31 .464 .804 -1.355 
Valid N 1614             
 
Correlations 
 Pearson Correlations for accelerated filers audit fees are presented in Table 22.  
LASSET, AFLEV, and SPECIAL correlate substantially with the dependent variable LAUDF 
(.542, .308, and .266, respectively).  All bivariate correlations are within acceptable 
ranges with several independent variables showing strong correlations with other 
independent variables.  AFLEV, a measure of firm’s total debt divided by its total assets, 
and LASSET, the natural log of total assets, have a correlation coefficient of .256.   
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SPECIAL (firm reports special items in Computstat – SPI) and MERGER report a .386 
correlation coefficient.  GC (going concern) and ICW report a .276 correlation 
coefficient.  These correlations are all positive, meaning as one independent variable 
increases so does the other.  Many other variables show significant correlations at 
either the .01 or .05 level.
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Table 22  
AF Audit Fee Model Pearson Correlations 
  LAUDF ICW BIG4 LASSET MERGER MB RECINV AFLEV SPECIAL RESTRUC GC ROA ROANEG 
LAUDF   1                         
Sig. (2-tailed)                           
N 1626                         
ICW   .091** 1                       
Sig. (2-tailed) .000                         
N 1626 1639                       
BIG4   .040 -.008 1                     
Sig. (2-tailed) .108 .751                       
N 1626 1639 1639                     
LASSET   .542** -.005 .025 1                   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .831 .317                     
N 1621 1632 1632 1632                   
MERGER   .144** -.026 -.025 .057* 1                 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .290 .316 .022                   
N 1626 1639 1639 1632 1639                 
MB   -.079** -.001 -.043 -.087** -.006 1               
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .969 .087 .000 .823                 
N 1612 1617 1617 1617 1617 1617               
RECINV   -.024 .107** -.014 -.057* .006 .036 1             
Sig. (2-tailed) .332 .000 .569 .022 .794 .153               
N 1619 1630 1630 1630 1630 1615 1630             
AFLEV   .308** .001 .000 .256** .136** .004 -.064** 1           
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .973 .989 .000 .000 .871 .010             
N 1621 1632 1632 1632 1632 1617 1630 1632           
SPECIAL   .266** -.006 -.034 .105** .386** -.012 .060* .129** 1         
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .810 .170 .000 .000 .635 .015 .000           
N 1626 1639 1639 1632 1639 1617 1630 1632 1639         
RESTRUC   .232** -.010 .002 .009 .162** -.006 .018 .050* .479** 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .676 .948 .714 .000 .799 .456 .044 .000         
N 1626 1639 1639 1632 1639 1617 1630 1632 1639 1639       
GC   .006 .276** -.018 -.066** -.036 .000 -.012 .017 -.028 -.025 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .820 .000 .459 .008 .151 .988 .614 .488 .253 .308       
N 1626 1639 1639 1632 1639 1617 1630 1632 1639 1639 1639     
ROA   
-.164** -.035 -.034 -.102** -.003 .360** .043 .022 -.071** -.079** 
-
.085** 
1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .161 .169 .000 .914 .000 .080 .369 .004 .001 .001     
N 1621 1632 1632 1632 1632 1617 1630 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632   
ROANEG   .104** .059* -.008 -.116** -.004 -.010 -.033 .055* .095** .131** .089** -.346** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .018 .756 .000 .872 .695 .177 .027 .000 .000 .000 .000   
N 1621 1632 1632 1632 1632 1617 1630 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Multicollinearity and VIF 
 Tolerance values for the AF audit fee independent variables range from .635 to 
.995.  Only SPECIAL and ROA have tolerance values below 0.70, the value considered to 
be the acceptable lower limit, at .635 and .698, respectively.  VIF values are all below 
the normally accepted standard of 4.0.  These results provide strong support that 
multicollinearity is not a issue for this model. 
Table 23 
AF Audit Fee Collinearity Statistics 
  
 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)     
ICW .908 1.101 
BIG4 .995 1.005 
LASSET .854 1.172 
MERGER .828 1.207 
MB .814 1.229 
SEGSQRT .837 1.195 
FOREIGN .871 1.148 
RECINV .968 1.033 
AFLEV .888 1.126 
SPECIAL .635 1.575 
RESTRUC .748 1.336 
GC .906 1.104 
ROA .698 1.433 
ROANEG .815 1.228 
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AF Audit Fee Regression Analysis  
Model Summary 
Table 24 presents the R values and standard error of the estimate, all values 
commonly presented to indicate the predictive value of the model.  The R square value 
of .445 indicates how much of the variance in the dependent variable (LAUDF) is 
explained by the model.  The small difference between the R square and the adjusted R 
square is due to the sample being sufficiently large. 
 The R square value of .445 suggests a moderately strong relationship between 
the dependent variable and the model’s independent variables.  This value is less than 
the R squares of 0.79 and 0.81 obtained by Krishnan et al., 2011, in their full and clean 
samples, respectively. 
Table 24 
AF Audit Fee Regression Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .667a .445 .440 .5075344 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Negative ROA (ROANEG), Engaged in Merger (MERGER), 
Market to Book Ratio (MB), Big 4 Auditor (BIG4), Rec and Inv percent of assets (RECINV), 
Going Concern (GC), Foreign Operations (FOREIGN), Audit Fee Leverage (AFLEV), 
Restructure Charge (RESTRUC), IC Weakness (ICW), Company Size (LASSET), Segment 
Sq Root (SEGSQRT), Return on Assets (ROA), Special Iterms Reported (SPECIAL) 
b. Dependent Variable: Log of Audit Fees (LAUDF) 
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Anova 
The Anova analysis provides the statistical test for the overall model fit in terms 
of the F ratio.  The F test is a test of overall significance.  That is, it determines whether a 
significant relationship exists between the dependent variable and all of the 
independent variables.   
Table 25 presents the Anova table used to test if a linear relationship exists 
between the variables by forming an F ratio of the mean square of the regression to the 
residual mean square and a test of the coefficients of regression analysis between 
variables.  Using the p-value approach, the rejection rule is to reject H4 if the p-value is 
less than or equal to 0. The p-value of .000 is less than the alpha of .05 and the null 
hypothesis is rejected.  Alternatively, SPSS calculates an F statistic of 91.699.  With 14 
degrees of freedom in the numerator and 1601 degrees of freedom in the denominator, 
F.05 equals 1.6950.  The F statistic of 91.699 is greater than 1.6950, therefore the null 
hypothesis is rejected and I conclude that audit fees decreased following the 
implementation of AS5 for accelerated filers.    
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Table 25 
AF Audit Fee ANOVA Analysisa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 330.692 14 23.621 91.699 .000b 
Residual 412.403 1601 .258     
Total 743.095 1615       
a. Dependent Variable: Log of Audit Fees (LAUDF) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Negative ROA (ROANEG), Engaged in Merger (MERGER), 
Market to Book Ratio (MB), Big 4 Auditor (BIG4), Rec and Inv percent of assets (RECINV), 
Going Concern (GC), Foreign Operations (FOREIGN), Audit Fee Leverage (AFLEV), 
Restructure Charge (RESTRUC), IC Weakness (ICW), Company Size (LASSET), Segment 
Sq Root (SEGSQRT), Return on Assets (ROA), Special Iterms Reported (SPECIAL) 
 
Regression Coefficients 
 The standardized regression coefficients are presented in Table 26.  LASSET 
makes the strongest unique contribution to explaining the dependent variable (LAUDF) 
with a standardized coefficient of .497.  AFLEV, RESTRUC, and FOREIGN also make 
unique contributions, with each significant at the .05 level. 
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Table 26 
AF Audit Fee Regression Coefficients 
Variables Coefficientsa t-value Significance 
(Constant)   25.151 .000 
ICW .087 4.452 .000 
BIG4 .031 1.684 .092 
LASSET .497 24.656 .000 
MERGER .019 .917 .360 
MB -.012 -.586 .558 
SEGSQRT .106 5.226 .000 
FOREIGN .120 6.010 .000 
RECINV -.004 -.188 .851 
AFLEV .169 8.575 .000 
SPECIAL .056 2.417 .016 
RESTRUC .127 5.911 .000 
GC .006 .318 .750 
ROA -.066 -2.944 .003 
ROANEG .097 4.681 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Log of Audit Fees (LAUDF) 
    R = .667 
    R2 = .445 
    F = 91.699 
    Significance = .000 
 
Based upon the coefficient values, the variables in the model explain only 0.445 
or 44.5 percent of the audit fees for the accelerated filer population.  Since this analysis 
is based on a model developed by an earlier researcher (Krishnan et al., 2011),  
sequential or combinatorial approaches omitting potential noncontributing independent 
variables was not employed to enhance the model predictability or explanation. 
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Trends in Audit Delay and Audit Fees 
The models for audit delay and audit fees were tested in SPSS using the samples 
for large accelerated filers and accelerated filers.  Multiple regression analyses were 
conducted on each model and sample using the combined observations for the seven-
year period of the study.  Results were carefully analyzed to determine if problems 
existed in the data or the model.  After review of each model using its associated large 
accelerated filer sample and accelerated filer sample, results obtained verified the 
validity of the model, the normal assumptions regression analysis, and the validity of the 
data.  In order to determine the trend during the seven-year period, each model and 
sample was analyzed year to year.  A discussion of those findings follows. 
 Table 28, Panel A, presents the mean of audit delay by calendar year as well as 
the mean for the entire seven-year period of the study.  Firms are divided into large 
accelerated filers and accelerated filers.    The mean audit delay for the large 
accelerated filers of 58.3 days for the first year of the study, 2007, represents a 
significant decrease for the first year of audit delay under AS5 compared to the 2006 
mean audit delay of 70 days Ettredge et al. (2006) find for the last year of AS2 and 64.23 
days Mitra et al. (2015) find in their full sample of clean firms.  Comparing results from 
2007, Mitra el al. (2015) find mean audit delay of 62.48 days under AS5 for their sample  
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of clean firms.  It would appear that audit delay decreased significantly during the first 
year of AS5.  However, looking at the year-to-year results, although audit delay again  
decreased during 2008-2010, in 2011 audit delay increased slightly (0.5 day), the 
decreased 0.7 days in 2012, and increased once again in 2013 by 0.9 days.  While audit 
delay in the large accelerated filer group decreased from 58.3 days to 54.8 days from 
2007 to 2013, mean audit delay from 2008 to 2013 was consistent from year to year, 
without significant change and, in fact, increased in the final year of this study. 
 Accelerated filer results for mean audit delay from 2007 to 2013 are presented in 
Panel A as well.  The mean audit delay behaved quite dissimilarly to results obtained by 
Mitra el al. (2015).  In their sample of clean accelerated filers, their trend shows a steady 
year-to-year decrease from 2007 to 2010, with a small increase in 2011 (the last year of 
their study).  Mean audit delay decreased each year from results of the prior year, with 
audit delay declining from 67.75 days in 2007 to 65.73 days in 2010.  Similar to results 
obtained in this study, they too report a small increase from 2010 to 2011 in each filer 
group. 
Table 27, Panel B, presents the mean of audit fees by calendar year as well as the 
mean for the entire seven-year period of the study.  As in Panel A, firms are divided into 
two groups, large accelerated filers and accelerated filers.  The panel shows the overall 
mean audit fee for large accelerated filers to be $4,995,000.  The purpose of this study  
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was to determine if audit fees declined following the implementation of AS5 and the 
period of the study begins with 2007 and ends with 2013.  During this seven-year  
period, Panel B reveals audit fees increased in 2008 compared to 2007, followed by 
consecutive decreases in 2009 and 2010.  Starting with 2011, audit fees began to 
increase each year, with 2013 results nearly $500,000 more than the seven-year mean.   
Such increases are likely caused by the economic recovery experienced nationally and 
globally beginning with 2010 and the likelihood audit firms were not as concerned about 
price sensitivity has they were in the earlier years of the this study. 
 Results for accelerated filers differ slightly from those of the large accelerated 
filer group.  Mean audit fees show a steady decrease from 2007 through 2010, followed 
by two consecutive years of increases, ending with a small decrease in 2013. 
 No consistent declining trends in audit delay or audit fees can be shown from 
results obtained in this study.  At best, results are inconsistent, with some years 
increasing from prior years, followed by decreases in subsequent years.  At worst, 
results tend to indicate a relative ineffectiveness of AS5 in moderating audit delay and 
audit fees.  
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Table 27 
 
Trends in Audit Delay and Audit Fees 
 
           Panel A: Audit Delay Mean (in days) by Calendar Year 
     
   
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Overall 
           Large Accelerated Filers 58.3 55.6 54.3 54.1 54.6 53.9 54.8 55.11 
           Accelerated Filers 
 
72.9 68.7 71.4 66.4 68.2 68.7 68.8 69.3 
           
           Panel B: Audit Fees Mean (in $M) by Calendar Year 
     
   
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Overall 
           Large Accelerated Filers $4.926 $5.014 $4.817 $4.796 $4.916 $5.103 $5.4 $4.995 
           Accelerated Filers 
 
1.027 1.017 0.952 0.926 0.943 1.254 1.114 1.034 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 In this study, the impact of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) on audit delay and 
audit fees on both large accelerated filers and accelerated filers is investigated.  This 
chapter presents a summary of the study and associated research findings.  Limitations 
of the research are discussed as well as areas of interest for future research.  This study 
extends the body of research on audit delay and audit fees in the AS5 era.  Finally, 
implications for researchers, practitioners, and regulators are discussed briefly. 
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Research Findings 
AS5 replaced Auditing Standard No. 2, a standard replete with new reporting 
requirements following the many accounting scandals and failures that occurred in and  
around the year 2000.  The PCAOB in its administrative and enforcement role 
established these standards in an effort to restore confidence in the accounting 
profession and the investing public in the integrity of publicly disclosed financial reports.  
Unintended consequences of this new auditing standard included audit fees 
substantially above those projected by the SEC and increased audit delay, most likely 
due to the additional reporting requirements imposed on external auditors.  Due to the 
heavy criticism of AS2 by not only public corporation executives and business 
organizations, the PCAOB responded by replacing it with AS5, effective in 2007.  The 
primary goal of AS5 was to streamline the audit process through several changes to the 
auditing standards and thus, reduce audit delay and audit fees.  Both large accelerated 
filers and accelerated filers were expected to benefit from this new standard, but it was 
expected that AS5 would have a greater effect on smaller firms, primarily due to the 
scalability of the audit procedures. 
Following well-established models for both audit delay and audit fees, I test to 
determine if, following implementation of AS5, reductions occurred to either or both  
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audit delay and audit fees.  Although the findings were inconsistent in both filer groups, 
audit delay in the large accelerated filer sample providing a consistent but not declining  
trend during the period of the study.  Other findings include a significant decrease in 
audit delay between years 2007 and 2008 in the accelerated filer group.  Unlike the 
large accelerated filers, audit delay sharply increased in 2009 followed by a sharp 
decrease (5.0 days) in 2010, then increased each year to the conclusion of the study 
period.  Findings for audit fees showed inconsistent result in both groups throughout 
the period of the study, with one exception.  Beginning in 2010, both groups exhibit 
increases in mean audit fees which are sustained throughout the period. 
Implications 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from the results presented in Chapter IV.  Both 
audit delay and audit fees exhibit strong relationships with the presence of internal 
control weaknesses, size of the firm, and complexity of the firm.  For firms wishing to 
disclose annual results ahead of auditor reports, the absence of internal control 
weaknesses would seem to provide the best avenue to this goal.  Firm size and 
complexity add extra dimensions to the audit, increasing time to complete as well as 
cost.  From a regulatory point of view, it appears AS5 has not yet met the intended 
reductions to audit delay and audit fees.  The PCAOB needs to remain vigilant in its  
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efforts to reduce the financial burden on publicly traded firms imposed by audit delay 
and audit fees. 
Limitations of this Study 
 As with most any study, certain limitations are inherent in this study.  First, not 
all firms identified in the Audit Analytics database as either a large accelerated filer or 
accelerated filer had data for all years of the study.  Second, not all firms identified in 
the Audit Analytics database as either a large accelerated filer or accelerated filer had  
the necessary financial statement data in the Compustat database.  Third, the 
requirement that all firms included in each sample have the same auditor, while acting 
as a strong control, eliminated some firms from the study which otherwise would have 
been included.  Fourth, although well-established models for both audit delay and audit 
fees were chosen from prior research, several of the independent variables in each part 
of the study failed to make any significant contributions in  
the regression analyses, leading to a possible conclusion that other variables may exist 
which could add better explanation to the models.  Finally, firms smaller than 
accelerated filers were not examined in this study.  As the scaling effect of AS5 was 
expected to have greater effect on small firms, the impact of AS5 on these firms is less 
well known. 
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Future Research Opportunities 
 These inconsistencies in findings should encourage further research into audit 
delay and audit fee behavior.  As long as neither can be shown to be decreasing, it is 
questionable whether AS5 achieved its objective of increasing efficiencies in the audit 
process or if efficiencies resulted in savings passed on to firms.  Based on the results 
obtained in this study, it is difficult to assert AS5 has reduced audit delay and audit fees. 
 Future researchers should continue to examine AS5 effectiveness.  Further 
studies replicating the samples of prior studies while increasing the period of the study 
would possibly reveal long term trends.  So far, researchers have chosen to examine AS5 
effects using either different sample configurations or different model criteria.  
Although some findings suggest AS5 effectiveness in one area, other findings provide 
inconsistent results, leaving the field open to further research. 
 Future research should explore other independent variables for possible drags 
on audit delay and audit costs.  Many independent variables in this study made weak or 
insignificant contributions in explaining audit delay and audit fees.  However, with 
results as inconsistent as these, it would appear other factors are contributing to the up 
and down results seen in the year-to-year trend analysis. 
 Changes to SEC 10-K filing deadlines for large accelerated filers might also 
provide another rich area of audit delay study.  These firms became subject to a 60-day  
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Form 10-K annual report filing deadline, beginning with the annual report filed for its 
first fiscal year ending on or after December 15, 2006.  Such a change, just ahead of the 
change to AS5, might have contributing effects on increased audit delay that are 
discernable from AS5 implementation alone. 
 Audit delay and audit fee behavior provide an opportunity for management to 
signal the success of their companies in the marketplace.  Future research might 
incorporate how signaling theory can be tied with agency theory in describing 
management behavior and attitudes towards reductions in audit delay and audit fees.  
Implications to financial statements and investor confidence to missed SEC 10-K and 10-
Q deadlines present another rich area for audit delay and/or audit fee study. 
 Additionally, with no clear, unambiguous results in this study, further study of 
audit delay and audit fee behavior remains necessary.  While the general economy 
seems to have recovered from the devastating effects of the accounting debacles that 
led to the downfall of many well-known and trusted U.S. companies and thus these 
changes to the regulatory oversight, the threat to the financial marketplace remains.  
Assessment must remain the watchword in determining how well regulations are 
performing in the quest to bring timely and accurate information to the market. 
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Research Contribution 
The purpose of this research was to examine the effectiveness of AS5 in reducing 
audit delay and audit fees as a goal of the PCAOB and SEC.  In order to determine its 
effectiveness, audit delay and audit fees of U.S. publicly traded firms were examined 
over the period 2007 through 2013.  Using well-established models for both audit delay 
and audit fees, initial decreases in both audit delay and audit fees was shown to occur 
immediately following the implementation of AS5 in both large accelerated filers and 
accelerated filers.  However, results for the entire period of the study were inconsistent 
and thus it is not possible to assert that AS5 has met its primary objective of simplifying 
the audit process and thus reducing audit delay and audit fees. 
 This study adds to the body of research into audit delay and audit fee behavior.  
It contributes to the existing literature by examining audit delay and audit fees for an 
extended period of the AS5 era.  No other studies have looked beyond simple 
comparisons of the last two years of AS2 to the first two years of AS5.  No other studies 
have provided a trend analysis over a seven-year period.  As with any research, there is 
still more which can be understood about audit delay and audit fee behavior.  Perhaps 
future researchers will address issues identified above.  Although the results of this 
study yielded inconsistent results as to the effectiveness of AS5, the contribution of this 
study is still positive and adds to the literature in this area.  Additional research based  
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on the findings of this study and suggestions for future research will aid in determining 
regulatory changes aimed at improving the audit function. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
TERMINOLOGY 
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Definition of Terms 
Accelerated filer -A term used by the Securities and Exchange Commission to describe a 
firm issuing reports (i.e., Forms 10-K, 10-Q) by both its size and obligation to meet 
accelerated filing deadlines for these reports.  Large accelerated filers are firms with a 
public equity float of $700 million or more.  Accelerated filers are firms with a public 
equity float between $70 million and $700 million.  Non-Accelerated filers are firms that 
are neither large accelerate filers or accelerated filers 
Audit delay - the time from the end of the accounting year to the time external auditors 
sign off on their audit reports.  Audit delay is also referred to as audit report lag or audit 
lag. 
Audit fees – The fees charged by auditors for the SOX Section 404 audit of internal 
controls 
Audit related fee – The audit fee attributed to the incremental audit procedures 
required to audit an issuer’s internal control over financial reporting as required by SOX 
404  
External auditor-auditors who are external to, and independent of, the firm being 
audited, both in fact and appearance, having no financial and/or managerial interest in 
the entity being audited  
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SOX-Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 – main goal was to improve the quality of financial 
reporting and to increase investor’s confidence. 
SOX-Section 404 – mandates that external auditors ‘attest’ to management’s 
assessment of the company controls. Costs classified into three categories; additional 
audit fees, internal labor costs, and external consulting/technology expenses.  
PCAOB – Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The PCAOB is a nonprofit 
corporation established by Congress to oversee the audits of public companies.  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which created the PCAOB, required that auditors of U.S. 
public companies be subject to external and independent oversight for the first time in 
history.   
Public float – the part of equity not held by management or large shareholders as 
reported on the first page of the company 10K.  The portion of a company's outstanding 
shares that is in the hands of public investors, as opposed to company officers, 
directors, or controlling-interest investors. 
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